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ARTICLE
LAW AND POLICY ISSUES CONCERNING THE
PROVISION OF ADEQUATE LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE POOR
Quintin Johnstone*
One of this country's most serious legal problems is the shortage of
adequate legal services for poor persons. This shortage has long pre-
vailed in this country and may become even greater in the future. Lack
of sufficient funding is one reason for the shortage but not the only one.
The principal focus of this Article is on the often highly controversial law
and policy issues relevant to providing and funding increased legal ser-
vices for the poor by significant providers or funders of such services in
the United States in the recent past. Proposals are also made for how
each issue should be resolved in the future and strategies are considered
for attaining proposal objectives. The Article also recommends a very
important role for the American Bar Association.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year a vast number of poor persons in the United States are in
need of legal services from qualified legal service providers that they
cannot pay for.' Some of these poor persons have the knowledge and
ability to provide the needed services themselves without undue risk, but
most do not. Many service providers have long been available to provide
legal services to poor persons in need of legal services they cannot pay
for. 2 Those currently available include legal aid, public defender, and
other nonprofit organizations staffed by lawyers and their support staff
personnel, 3 many lawyers in private practice who have volunteered some
of their time and that of their support staff to providing legal services for
the poor at no fee, and many law school faculty members and students,
and court-appointed lawyers.4 Some judges and some of their support
staff personnel also provide helpful information about the law and court
procedures to some of the parties appearing pro se before their court,
including many poor persons appearing pro se. Although precise data is
lacking, and probably unascertainable, as to the total number of qualified
persons in the United States who currently are active in providing legal
services to the poor who cannot pay for needed services, there are no
I The term "poor persons" in this Article generally means those persons each of whose
income is at or below 125% of the poverty level, a definition of low-income persons followed
by the Legal Services Corporation. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA E-2 (2005) [hereinafter LSC, JUSTICE GAP, 2005]; LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, WHAT IS THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION? 2 (1997). Comparable terms are
indigent persons and persons of limited means. The number of individuals living below 125%
of the federal poverty level in the United States increased from 49.6 million in 2005 to 53.8
million in 2008. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN
AMERICA 6 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter LSC, JUSTICE GAP, 2009]. Not considered in this Article
to be poor persons in need of legal services are those poor persons who lack available funds to
pay for needed legal services but who obtain needed representation from a law firm on a
contingent fee basis, the law firm receiving a percentage of any recovery as its only fee. No
recovery, no fee. Such a poor person is considered able to pay because of the apparent value
of the claim.
2 On the history of legal assistance to the poor, see generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN &
JOHN A. DOOLEY, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY (1984); ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE,
CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY
OF CivtL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2003); Joan Mahoney, Green Forms and
Legal Aid Offices: A History of Publicly Funded Legal Services in Britain and the United
States, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 223 (1998); William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law
Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the
1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 241 (1998).
3 Some of these organizations provide legal services only to certain kinds of poor per-
sons with legal problems. Examples of such organizations in Connecticut are the Center for
Children's Advocacy, the Children's Law Center, and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center.
4 On court appointments, see Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 10 (2004). However, court appointments at no compensation to the appointee have
been held unconstitutional in some states. See infra note 178.
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doubt many thousands of them and their total number has increased sub-
stantially in recent years.5
An increasingly prevalent form of legal representation in this coun-
try is pro se representation, those in need of legal services providing the
services themselves. Many pro se parties are poor persons who were
unable to obtain the needed services from available qualified legal ser-
vice providers for the poor because of the inadequate supply of such
providers. In many U.S. communities, assistance is available to help pro
se parties, including many poor persons, represent themselves more
effectively.
Despite the substantial number of qualified persons and their sup-
port staff personnel available to provide legal services to the poor who
cannot pay for the services, the number is far short of what is needed.
This has resulted in many poor persons who have sought legal services
from qualified providers being denied such services or provided only
limited services. Denial was usually due to a provider being fully
booked-up when the request was made. Limited legal service usually
occurred because the provider was willing to take on more poor clients
than it could fully serve but to provide only limited help to many of
them, with those receiving limited help often expected to provide the
remaining needed services pro se.
The shortage of legal services for the poor, inadequate in volume
and often in quality, has long existed in the United States. In recent
years the shortage has been so great that in the recent past, millions of
poor people in this country who were in need of legal services and who
sought help from one or more qualified providers never received any
services or only inadequate services from the requested qualified provid-
ers. 6 Stated very succinctly, the increase in demand has greatly exceeded
5 For example, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) has estimated that in 2007 the
total number of legal aid lawyers in the United States was 7,931, a ratio of 1 lawyer to 6,415
low-income persons in the United States. LSC, JUSTICE GAP, 2009, supra note 1, at 21. But in
2007, the ratio of all lawyers providing legal services to the general population was one lawyer
to 429 persons in the general population, a numerical indicator of the shortage in the United
States of available legal services for the poor. Id. Of the 7,931 legal aid lawyers in 2007, 53%
of them worked in LSC-funded programs. Id.
6 The LSC has estimated that in 2009, 944,000 low-income persons in need of civil
legal services will have sought help from LSC-funded providers of legal services for the poor
and were rejected because of insufficient program resources. Id. at 12. Further, "[t]his means
that for every client served by an LSC-funded program, at least one eligible person seeking
help will be turned down." Id. The 2009 Justice Gap Report also has these conclusions:
As an initial critical goal, there must be enough funding to serve all of those
currently seeking help from LSC grantees. This requires a doubling of LSC funds
and a doubling of the state, local, and private funds that also support LSC grantees.
[S]tate legal needs studies conducted from 2000 to 2009 generally indicate that
less than one in five low-income persons get the legal assistance they need. To fund
this need, the federal government share must grow to be five times greater than it is
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the available supply. In addition to those poor persons in need of legal
services from qualified legal service providers who requested the needed
services from qualified providers but whose requests were denied or not
adequately fulfilled, there have been far more poor persons in the recent
past that had a legal problem but who never sought help. Hence their
needs were never adequately fulfilled.7 Due to the shortage of supply,
many in this latter group also would have been unsuccessful in acquiring
the services they needed had they sought them from qualified providers.
The supply shortage in most U.S. communities is more acute for those
persons with civil legal problems than for those with criminal legal
problems. The principal reason for this is that every defendant in a crim-
inal case in which a prison sentence may be imposed has a constitutional
right to appointment of counsel if the defendant cannot afford to retain
counsel. However, there is no comparable constitutional right to counsel
if a party in a civil case cannot afford counsel.8 A few state courts have
held parties in some very limited types of civil cases to be entitled to
counsel at public expense.9 Some state statutes also confer on indigent
parties the right to counsel in a few very limited types of civil cases.10
now, or $1.6 billion. IOLTA and other state, local and private funding sources,
which are being hard hit by the economic downturn at present, will also have to
grow in the future to contribute their proportionate share of the increase necessary to
fund civil legal services.
Id. at 3. The 2009 Justice Gap Report also discusses some of the recent state studies on legal
needs of low-income people. Id. at A-i -D- 1.
7 Id. at 9. Many of these persons were unaware of the availability of legal service
assistance, or of their eligibility for legal services from a qualified provider at no fee, or they
believed that the provider would not be able to assist them. Id. at 10. Many of them no doubt
were also unaware that their problem was a legal one. Id.
8 The right of defendants in criminal cases to counsel is a Sixth Amendment right, and
the most frequently referred to case on this right is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). But the U.S. Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18
(1981), with a 5-4 decision, held that an indigent mother in proceedings to terminate her right
to custody of her minor child was not constitutionally entitled to appointment of counsel, an
opinion widely perceived as holding that indigents generally are not constitutionally entitled to
appointment of counsel in civil cases unless the indigent person's physical liberty is threatened
by the court's decision. On the Lassiter case, see Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the
Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of
Lassister v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 635
(2006); Eric Buermann, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: The Right to Counsel in
Parental Termination Proceedings, 36 U. MiAMI L. REV. 337 (1982); Earl Johnson, Jr., "And
Justice for All," When Will the Pledge Be Fulfilled, 47 JUDGES J. 5 (2008). Johnson was for
many years a judge on the California Court of Appeals. In this Article he strongly recom-
mends a more extensive judicial recognition of right to counsel in civil cases.
9 See Clara Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State Court Right-to-Counsel
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186, 188 (2006).
10 For a brief review of the law as to the right of indigent parties to counsel in civil cases
and a recommendation urging federal, state, and local governments to provide legal counsel as
a matter of legal right at public expense in those categories of adversarial proceedings where
basic human rights are at stake, see ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 520 (2006). A number of other bar associations joined in making this
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However, despite court decisions holding that poor persons charged with
crimes have a constitutional right to counsel, in many U.S. jurisdictions
the number of public defenders or other lawyers available to represent
poor persons charged with crimes is inadequate. This has resulted in
many poor persons charged with crimes, and who sought help from qual-
ified legal service providers, receiving no representation or insufficient
representation, a violation of their constitutional right to counsel."
There obviously has been a tremendous increase over time in the
number of poor people in the United States in need of legal services from
qualified legal service providers, a number that obviously has continued
to outpace available supply. But why this tremendous increase? There
are many reasons but two of the most obvious and important ones are the
great expansion that has occurred over time in the U.S. population, a
population that always has had a high percentage of poor people, 12 and
the adoption of new laws that add to the number of different kinds of
legal problems that the poor commonly encounter. Many of these new
laws establish or modify government aid programs that many poor peo-
ple benefit from-programs such as Social Security, Medicaid, and pub-
lic housing. Fluctuations in national or regional economic prosperity
also influence not only the number of poor persons in need of legal ser-
vices but the available supply of such services. Economic recessions,
such as the recent one, result in sharp increases in the number of poor
persons in need of legal services, and, due largely to decreased funding
of legal service providers for the poor, a decline in the supply of legal
services for the poor.13
recommendation. For a copy of the ABA Report and a series of articles generally supportive
of the right of indigent persons to counsel in civil cases, see Edward V. Sparer Symposium,
Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REv. 501 (2006).
11 ABA COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDERS, Gideon's Broken Promise:
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, A Report on the American Bar Association's
Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases 38 (2004) [hereinafter ABA, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE]; Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1073 (2006); Steven B. Bright, Neither
Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Lib-
erty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 785-86.
12 For example, in 2008 the U.S. resident population was 304 million; in 1980 it was 228
million; in 1950 it was 151 million; in 1900 it was 76 million. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010 8-9 (2009). The U.S. Census Bureau estimate
of the U.S. resident population in 2050 is 439 million. Id. at 10.
13 In the recent recession, for example, funding of legal aid agencies has declined sub-
stantially due to the decreased income from lawyer trust account income. On this decline and
its impact, see Erik Eckholm, Interest Rate Drop Has Dire Results for Legal Aid Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A12. On the recent decline in IOLTA income see Jane E. Curran,
Recovery: What IOLTA Programs Can Do Now to Maximize Revenue and Protect Revenue in
the Future, 13 DIALOGUE 7 (2009). In some states the decline in legal aid agency funding has
been reduced somewhat by recent laws that add to that funding. For example, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §52-259c (West 2011) increases state court filing fees, the increases to go mostly
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The response of some legal service providers to the continued se-
vere shortage of legal services for the poor, particularly the response of
some legal aid agencies and some law school faculty members and stu-
dents, has been to focus their efforts, or more of their efforts, not on
representing poor persons individually but on more comprehensively re-
ducing poverty or the consequences of poverty. Among actions taken to
achieve these more comprehensive objectives are selecting and vigor-
ously litigating cases, some of them class actions that will be lead cases
in benefiting many poor persons; lobbying government officials and
agencies to help achieve laws beneficial to poor persons; and educating
groups of poor persons as to laws and legal remedies relevant to them.
These actions taken by some legal service providers and prospects for
more such actions resulted in very restrictive and controversial legisla-
tion by Congress on funding of legal services for the poor by the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC), a federal government agency. These re-
strictions are considered in the discussion hereafter of the LSC.
The principal focus of this Article is on law and policy issues rele-
vant to the provision or funding of legal services for the poor by signifi-
cant providers or funders of such services in the United States during the
recent past and how each issue should be resolved. In the consideration
of most every issue a proposal is made as to action that should be taken
to resolve or help resolve the issue. Most of these proposals are not new
but it is here urged that each of them merits high priority support by
proponents of more adequate legal services for the poor. The Conclusion
of this Article considers the strategies that proponents may engage in to
help in achieving adoption of the proposals. In this Article an issue is a
question with alternative possible solutions that merit consideration as to
which solution is preferable; a legal issue is a question as to the meaning,
enforcement, or legal validity of an existing or proposed law; and a pol-
icy issue is a question as to what is the justified objective for action taken
or proposed to help resolve or alleviate a social problem. Legal and pol-
icy issues often are interrelated, as solution of many legal issues is often
determined or influenced by one or more policy issue solutions. Most
every law is adopted to resolve or help resolve one or more policy issues
and many laws, either expressly or by implication, indicate what policy
or policies they are intended to further. Lawmaking bodies, their com-
mittees, or their individual members also often make statements helpful
to legal aid agencies in the state. IOLTA revenues in Connecticut declined from $21 million
in 2007 to an estimated $4 million in 2009. Christian Nolan, Help For Legal Aid, Higher Bills
for Others, CONN. L. TRIB., July 6, 2009, at 3. The new filing fee increases are expected to
raise $7.7 million in the fiscal year following their adoption, assuming the volume of new
court cases filed does not decline. Id.; see also Margaret G. Tebo, Aiding Legal Aid: Some
States Are Looking at Court Fees as a Way to Provide Legal Services for the Poor, 88 A.B.A.
J. 28 (2002).
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in ascertaining the intended policies of particular laws. The policy or
policies that a particular law is intended to further can be very important
in the law's interpretation and its applicability.
Law and policy issues commonly arise when new laws, including
repeal or revision of existing laws, are under consideration by lawmaking
bodies or by others in government or the private sector that are propos-
ing, opposing, or critically evaluating proposed new laws. Included in
this latter group are academic scholars whose books and articles include
proposed new laws or evaluations of law reform proposals made by
others.
The multistate aspect of U.S. government has increased the volume
and frequency of law and policy issues in this country. Many states often
are faced with the same or a very similar problem, and if any one of these
states adopts an innovative law to reduce or eliminate the problem, the
issue often emerges as to whether one or more other states should adopt a
similar law. Our multistate structure is helpful in providing new and
innovative solutions to law and policy issues, but this often is accompa-
nied by law and policy controversies over whether a solution in one state
should be adopted in other states.
How particular law and policy issues should be resolved can be very
controversial and many law and policy issues, including some of those
concerning legal services for the poor, have resulted in extensive and
protracted controversy over how the particular issues should be resolved.
Most of these controversies are cyclical, increasing in intensity over time
as the problem the controversy is concerned with becomes more severe
or more extensively publicized, and as more participants who attempt to
influence how the controversy should be resolved increase in number. 14
A law and policy controversy also usually declines in intensity over time,
and may even vanish, if the underlying problem the controversy is fo-
cused on becomes less severe or disappears, or if a new law is adopted
that satisfactorily resolves the concerns of those who had been active
participants in the controversy.
Many law and policy controversies concerning the provision of ade-
quate legal services for the poor are over proposals to increase the vol-
ume or impact of such services. In these controversies, support for such
increases often has come from those currently providing legal services
for the poor, some bar associations or bar association committees, cause-
organizations that serve or further the interests of the poor, and more
liberal government or political party officials or organizations. Opposi-
14 On the cyclical nature of many law and policy issues, see Anthony Downs, The Issue-
Attention Cycle and the Political Economy of Improving Our Environment, in THE POLIrrCAL
ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 9 (Joe S. Bains & Warren F. Ilchman eds., 1972).
The analysis by Downs concentrates on environmental issues.
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tion to such increases often has come from business interests that will be
adversely affected financially by the enhanced legal services resulting
from the increases; conservative individuals and conservative cause orga-
nizations opposed to most all forms of expanded government assistance
and intervention; and, in funding controversies, the recipients or potential
recipients of funding who may receive less funding from the government
or other sources of funding if legal services for the poor is increased.
In most law and policy controversies, including those concerning
the provision of adequate legal services for the poor, a policy that many
participants often are seeking to further is a solution that they perceive
will be in their own self-interest. They take or propose certain action
because they have concluded that the action, or the proposed action if
implemented, will be beneficial to them or, if they represent an organiza-
tion, beneficial to the organization's members. The self-interest being
furthered commonly is enhanced monetary income. Self-interest policies
often are not publicly declared but are implicit given who is taking or
proposing action and what action is being taken or proposed. Examples
of what appear to be implicit self-interest policies in controversies con-
cerning issues relevant to adequate legal services for the poor are the
opposition of many lawyers and law firms to legally imposing a
mandatory pro bono requirement on lawyers; opposition of many banks
to a legal requirement that they pay interest or dividends on Interest on
Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) accounts comparable to what they pay
on non-IOLTA accounts; and support by many lawyers in private law
practice of unauthorized practice laws that prohibit nonlawyers from pro-
viding legal services to others, including the poor, and who also support
proposals for more vigorous enforcement of such laws.
Who the ultimate decision maker is with the requisite authority and
influence to make a decision that at least for the time being would pur-
portedly resolve any one of the controversial issues considered in this
Article may vary with the type of issue. The ultimate decision maker in
most controversial issues concerning government funding of adequate le-
gal services for the poor usually is the funding jurisdiction's legislature.
In controversial issues involving IOLTA it usually is the state courts; in
controversial issues concerning pro bono legal services for the poor it
usually is the state courts; in controversial issues concerning provision of
legal services by law schools or law school personnel it usually is each
law school; in controversial issues concerning assistance to poor persons
representing themselves pro se it usually is legal aid or other organiza-
tions whose activities are concentrated on providing legal services for the
poor or it is the courts. But as is quite apparent in Parts I to V of this
Article that on some issues in each of the five categories of issues being
considered, the ultimate decision maker may be a decision maker other
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than the usual one. Also, as to some issues, the authority of the ultimate
decision maker has been delegated to it by another authoritative body
that could terminate the delegation. For example, delegation by the U.S.
Congress to the LSC of authority to allocate appropriated federal funds
to various organizations that provide civil legal services for the poor.
This Article considers these particularly significant law and policy
issues concerning the provision of adequate legal services for the poor in
the United States as follows: Part I, Issues Concerning the Legal Services
Corporation; Part II, Issues Concerning Interest on Lawyer Trust Ac-
count (IOLTA) Programs; Part III, Issues Concerning Pro Bono Legal
Services for the Poor; Part IV, Issues Concerning Provision of Legal Ser-
vices for the Poor By Law Schools, Their Students, and Their Faculty
Members; and Part V, Issues Concerning Assistance to Poor Persons
Representing Themselves Pro Se. The Conclusion, in addition to a con-
sideration of strategies for achieving proposal adoptions, recommends a
much expanded role for the American Bar Association in increasing the
volume of adequate legal services for the poor in the United States.
I. ISSUES CONCERNING THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
In recent years the largest single source of funding of civil legal
services for the U.S. poor has been the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC), a private corporation funded by the federal government.15 Other
funding sources for civil legal services for the U.S. poor are IOLTA,
other federal grants, state and local government grants, private grants, 16
and miscellaneous sources. In 2008, funding from the LSC for civil legal
services for the U.S. poor totaled $355 million. The total that year from
all other sources totaled about $528 million.17 Although in recent years
the LSC has been the largest single source of funding of civil legal ser-
vices for the poor, Congress has retained the right to determine the
amount of annual funding of the LSC, to impose restrictions on those
receiving LSC funding, to alter the powers of the LSC board, and to
15 LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, FACT BOOK 2008 8 (2009) [hereinafter LSC FACT
BOOK 2008]. An estimate of the total in 2005 is $983 million. Alan W. Houseman, Future
Changes and Prospects for Legal Aid and Public Defender Organizations, 24 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 557, 562-63 (2006).
16 For example, United Way, foundation grants, bar association grants.
17 LSC FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 15, at 8. For the year 2008, funding from these
other sources was: IOLTA, $112 million; other federal grants, $63 million; state and local
government grants, $194 million; private grants, $51 million; and miscellaneous sources, $108
million, $61 million of which were carryover funds. Id. The total of $883 million also in-
cludes $1.7 million from client service income, mostly fees and receipts from client services.
Id. These statistical calculations include not only the totals of 2008 funding of civil legal
services for the poor in U.S. states and the District of Columbia but also the funding of civil
legal services for the poor in certain territories including Guam, Micronesia, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands. Id. at 5-6.
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abolish the corporation. The LSC was initially established by the Legal
Services Corporation Act of 1974,18 an act that has had a number of
amendments.19 The LSC is funded by annual Congressional appropria-
tions and these annual appropriations have varied considerably. 20 The
2010 fiscal year appropriation for the LSC was $420 million, 21 up from
$390 million in fiscal year 200922 and $351 million in fiscal year 2008.23
The 2010 fiscal year appropriation was the largest ever for the LSC, but
adjusted for inflation, the largest LSC appropriation was $400 million in
1994.24 The 1994 fiscal year appropriation adjusted for inflation would
be about $600 million in 2010 dollars. In the past fifteen years the small-
est fiscal year appropriation for the LSC was $283 million in 199725 and
also in 1998.26
The LSC allocates funds for civil legal services for the poor to re-
cipients in all states, the District of Columbia, and several territories.2 7
The allocation to each recipient jurisdiction is based on the percentage of
the total population of poor personS28 in all recipient jurisdictions (the
states, the District of Columbia, and the territories) that are in each recip-
ient jurisdiction as determined by the most recent U.S. Bureau of the
Census decennial census data.29 In fiscal year 2008, the jurisdictions
with the greatest LSC funding for civil legal services for the poor were
California, $46 million; Texas, $30 million; and New York, $26 mil-
18 Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974).
19 For the act's current provisions see 42 U.S.C. § 2296 (2006). The LSC has adopted
regulations, some of them clarifying the statutory restriction, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1644 (2009).
20 For a list of all fiscal year appropriations for the LSC from 1976 to 2008 see LSC
FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 15, at 3.
21 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3148
(2009). This appropriation was to be used for the following: $394,400,000 for basic field
programs and required independent audits; $4,200,000 for the Office of Inspector General;
$17,000,000 for management and grants oversight; $3,400,000 for client help and informa-
tional technology; $1,000,000 for loan repayment assistance. Id.
22 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-008, 123 Stat. 524, 593 (2009).
23 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 1923
(2007).
24 Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 1759 (1994).
25 Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2472 (1997).
26 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-107 (1998).
27 Territories that received LSC funding in fiscal 2008 are Guam, Micronesia, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORAION:
BACKGROUND AND FUNDING (2010).
28 Poor persons are those whose household incomes do not exceed 125% of the federal
poverty guidelines. Id. at 1-2. In 2007, 125% of the federal poverty guidelines was $25,813
for a household of four, but somewhat higher in Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
29 Id. at 12.
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lion.3o In that fiscal year the jurisdictions with the smallest LSC funding
for such services were Guam, $312,000; Virgin Islands, $313,000; Ver-
mont, $607,000; and Delaware, $646,000.31 In fiscal year 2008, jurisdic-
tions for which LSC funding was the largest percentage of total funding
of legal services for the poor were Wyoming, 100%; Vermont, 90.4%;
and Alabama, 86.4%.32 In that fiscal year, jurisdictions for which LSC
funding was the smallest percentage of total funding of legal services for
the poor were New Jersey, 14.3%; Maryland, 17.7%; and Ohio, 18.4%.33
In fiscal year 2008, the percentage of total funding of civil legal services
for the poor in some of the larger population states was 51% in Califor-
nia, 39.1% in Illinois, 28.4% in New York, 32.6% in Pennsylvania, and
57.4% in Texas. 34
There were 137 programs that received LSC funding in fiscal year
2008.35 In 2008, these programs served 888,000 clients, 3 6 opened
235,000 cases, and closed 889,000 cases.37 The types of cases closed in
2008 by percentage were: family, 35.1%;38 housing, 25.8%;39 consumer/
finance, 12.2%;40 income maintenance, 11.1%;41 health, 3.5%;42 em-
ployment, 3.0%;43 juvenile, 1.7%;" individual rights, 1.5%;45 education,
0.8%;46 and miscellaneous, 5.4%.47 Only 8.5% of the cases closed in
2008 were closed as the result of a court decision.48 The most common
30 Id. at 12-14.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
3'4 Id.
35 See LSC FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 15, at 1.
36 Id.
37 Id. The number of clients served is less than the number of cases closed because some
clients were each served by LSC programs in more than one case. Id.
38 Id. at 15. For example, divorce/separation, 119,415 cases; custody/visitation, 89,056
cases; domestic abuse, 44,719 cases; support, 28,241 cases. Id. at 16.
39 Id. Many of these cases were eviction cases. SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 27, at 4.
40 LSC FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 15, at 16. For example, collections, 50,419 cases;
bankruptcy/debtor relief, 31,663 cases. Id.
41 Id. For example, SSI, 33,373 cases; unemployment compensation, 15,154 cases; food
stamps, 13,018 cases.
42 Id. For example, Medicaid, 19,075 cases.
43 Id. For example, wage claims and other FLSA issues, 3,921 cases; taxes, 3,656 cases;
employment discrimination, 3,226 cases.
44 Id. For example, minor guardian/conservatorships, 5,577 cases; neglected/abused/de-
pendent, 4,334 cases; delinquent, 2,529 cases.
45 Id. For example, immigration/naturalization, 5,115 cases.
46 Id. For example, special education/learning disabilities, 1,629 cases; discipline, 1,026
cases.
47 Id. For example, wills/estates, 17,898 cases.
48 Id. at 11.
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reason for case closure that year was advice by counsel, 60.3% of case
closures. 4 9
The function of the LSC is to distribute federal funding to various
organizations that provide legal services to the poor and to monitor these
grantees to assure that the allocated funds are being properly utilized. It
was anticipated that this intermediary format by a private corporation
would prevent the political favoritism in many funding allocations that
would exist if such allocations were made by a government agency. It
also would permit more centralized control over federal anti-poverty
programs.50
The annual congressional appropriations for the LSC have often
been highly controversial. But even more controversial have been the
statutory restrictions imposed on the activities of recipients of such
funds, restrictions that must be complied with if the recipients are
granted and accept LSC funding.5' Some of these restrictions were im-
posed by the 1974 act creating the LSC, others were later imposed, and a
number of them were imposed by the Omnibus Consolidated Recessions
and Appropriations Act of 1996.52 LSC regulations have amplified some
of the restrictions. Among the activities of LSC recipients prohibited by
laws currently in effect are these: lobbying legislative bodies,53 support-
ing or conducting training that advocates particular public policies,54 ini-
tiating or participating in class actions,55 participating in any litigation
49 Id. ("[T]he advocate ascertained and reviewed relevant facts, exercised judgment in
interpreting the particular facts presented by the client and in applying the relevant law to the
facts presented, and counseled the client on his or her legal problems."). The percentage of
other LSC funded program case closures in 2008 were settlement without litigation, 4.6%;
limited action, 18.7% (e.g., communication with a third party or preparation of a simple legal
document); agency decision, 3.2%; extensive services, 2.4% (e.g., preparation of complex le-
gal documents or provision of extensive transactional work); and other closure methods, 0.6%.
Id.
50 John A. Dooley, Legal Services in the 1990s, in CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE
1990s: PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ACCESS To
JUSTICE IN THE 1990s 219, 223 (1991).
51 On the restrictions, see Carmen Solomon-Fears, Legal Services Corporation: Restric-
tions on Activities, in LEGAL AM FOR THE POOR AND THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION (Carl
T. Donovan ed., 2010).
52 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-50 (1996). Other restrictions and restriction modifications or clari-
fications were added in 1997 and 2009. Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23, 28 (1997); Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.105-119, 111 Stat. 2440,
2510 (1997); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034
(2009). On the current restrictions, see 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)-(e) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(f).
53 42 U.S.C. § 2996e (c) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 1612 (2009).
54 42 U.S.C. § 2996e (e) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 1612.8(a) (2009).
55 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 1617 (2009).
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involving abortion, 5 6 representing most aliens not lawfully present in the
United States,57 challenging or reforming state or federal welfare reform
laws,58 and representing persons charged with crimes.59 Recipients of
LSC funds with funding from other sources also may not use the non-
LSC funds for most any of the restricted activities,60 but they may trans-
fer their non-LSC funds to an individual or entity that uses the funds for
restricted activities.61
Many aspects of the LSC's operations and those of recipients of its
funding have raised important and often controversial law and policy is-
sues ever since the LSC was initially established in 1974. The most sig-
nificant and persistently controversial of these issues are: (1) whether the
LSC should be abolished; (2) whether extensive legal restrictions should
be imposed by the federal government on recipients of LSC funding and,
if so, what restrictions; and (3) how much should the federal government
appropriate each year for the LSC. Some of the pro and con arguments
that have been advanced on each side of these three controversial issues
are considered below.
A. Should the LSC be Abolished?
On the abolition of the LSC, one conservative publication observes,
"While the stated purpose of Congress in setting up the Legal Services
Corporation as an independent entity was to make it 'free from the influ-
ence or use of it by political pressures,' what Congress actually accom-
plished was merely to insulate it from political accountability." 62 Many
politically conservative proponents of abolishing the LSC also have as-
serted that the LSC should be abolished because it cannot effectively be
reformed. They assert that not only does the LSC's independent entity
status make it difficult to reform, but efforts by Congress to reform the
LSC and those to whom the LSC allocates funding have been ignored or
circumvented. 63 Political conservatives also have argued that, what they
56 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (2006).
57 45 C.F.R. § 1626 (2009).
58 45 C.F.R. § 1639 (2009).
59 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(2) (2006).
60 45 C.F.R. § 1610.03-04 (2009).
61 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7 (2009). On these transfer rights, see Alan W. Houseman, Interpre-
tation of LSC Restrictions, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 294-96 (1998).
62 RAEL J. ISAAC & ERICH ISAAC, THE COERCIVE UTOPIANS, SOCIAL DECEPTION BY
AMERICA'S POWER PLAYERS 241 (1983).
63 See KENNETH F. BOEHM & PETER T. FLAHERTY, WHY THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORA-
TION MUST BE ABOLISHED (1995), available at www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/
bgl057.cfm. Similar arguments are made in Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services Program:
Unaccountable, Political, Anti-poor, Beyond Reform and Unnecessary, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REV. 321, 322-27, 367 (1998); see also William J. Olson, Program Monitoring, in LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE POOR, TIME FOR REFORm 123 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990); Howard
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claim is, the LSC's liberal political activism and bias justify its abolition.
This argument is typified in the following 1997 agenda statement of the
Conservative Action Team, a group of seventy right-wing Republican
Party members of the U.S. House of Representatives:
We will eliminate funding for the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) [and thereby effectively abolish it], a
reckless agency that under the guise of helping poor peo-
ple with legal assistance, uses tax dollars to advance a
radical, left-wing agenda. We intend to pull the plug [on
this program] not simply because it is the fiscally re-
sponsible thing to do, but more importantly because we
believe in reinstating the proper limits of government
and respecting the values of the American people.64
Some LSC opponents also argue that the LSC should be abolished be-
cause it funds efforts by its grantees to further antisocial conduct, includ-
ing welfare dependency, drug and alcohol abuse, criminal conduct,
unemployment, and broken homes.65 Among the many other examples
of such alleged antisocial efforts by LSC grantees that have occurred are
seeking social security disability benefits for alcoholics and drug ad-
dicts, 66 and discouraging mediation as a reasonable alternative prior to a
divorce proceeding. 67
One solution that has been proposed by some who favor abolishing
the LSC is to replace the LSC with a federal government agency having
similar funding allocation functions but that would be directly accounta-
ble to Congress.68 One problem with this proposal, that obviously makes
it unsatisfactory to many political conservatives, is that if and when Con-
gress is dominated by liberal members, many recipients of the federal
agency's funding quite likely would engage in the same or similar politi-
cal and ideological activities to those that some recipients of LSC fund-
ing currently engage in and that conservatives find unacceptable. 69
Phillips, Legal Services Should Not Be Federally Funded, CONSERVATIVE DIG., July 1980, at
16.
64 John Kilwein, The Decline of the Legal Services Corporation: It's "Ideological Stu-
pid," in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID, COMPARATIVE AND HISTOIUCAL STUDIEs 61
(Francis Regal et al. eds., 1999).
65 See, e.g., Boehm, supra note 63, at 336-57.
66 See id. at 344-45.
67 See id. at 355. Boehm provides additional examples of LSC grantees' allegedly anti-
social activities that are no longer permissible because of statutory restrictions added in 1996.
See id. at 343 (describing representation of drug criminals in eviction cases); id. at 347-48
(describing representation of prisoners); id. at 348 (describing representation of illegal aliens).
68 E.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Legal Services for the Poor, Time for Reform, in CivIL
JUsTIcE: AN AGENDA FOR 1990s; supra note 50, at 536-37.
69 See BOEHM & FLAHERTY, supra note 63.
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LSC proponents argue that the LSC should not be abolished. They
assert that the LSC performs an essential role that should be retained.70
As the then-Chairman of the LSC stated in an article supportive of the
LSC published in 1997:
[LSC's] role has always been conceived as provid-
ing a national foundation for the provision of access to
justice on which others can and should build. While
other funding sources may have an increased signifi-
cance within the delivery system today, LSC's leader-
ship is still crucial in two important respects. First, the
corporation is the steward of the federal government's
commitment to equal justice for all .... Second, as part
of its role in providing a national foundation for the de-
livery of legal services to low-income people, LSC has a
responsibility to ensure that the delivery system provides
through-out the country cost-effective assistance that
meets the highest standards of thoroughness, quality, and
professionalism. 71
A similar view was expressed a few years later in an article by the then-
President of the LSC in describing what he would be doing to help
achieve a more effective legal services system-what he refers to as the
LSC's new vision.72 He denies that dissolution of the LSC would fulfill
a conservative mandate7 3 and says this in discussing LSC's goal:
As a conservative Republican and a long-time legal
aid volunteer, I firmly believe that federally funded legal
services are critical to the vitality of our nation's justice
system. Our goal is to create the model public-private
partnership. To this end the principal objective must be
to bring justice into the lives of every low-income Amer-
ican. This new vision of legal services will allow the
government to finally fulfill its twenty-five-year-old
promise [of equal justice for all Americans]. 74
70 See Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our
National Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 743-45.
71 Id. at 744-45.
72 See John McKay, Federally Funded Legal Services: A New Vision of Equal Justice
Under Law, 68 TENN. L. REv. 101, 102-103 (2000).
73 Id. at 108.
74 Id. at 102-03.
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Proposal
The LSC should not be abolished. It has been an effective and de-
sirable intermediary agency between Congress and the providers of civil
legal assistance to poor persons in need of legal services, prevented some
of the political favoritism that would have resulted in less-merited alloca-
tions of federal funds, made available some helpful leadership to provid-
ers of civil legal services for the poor, and conducted and publicized
useful studies on the shortage of civil legal services for the poor.75 There
is, of course, the risk that the pro-legal services role of the LSC could be
substantially reduced if conservative political interests again dominate
Congress and the federal administration as they did in the mid-1990s. 76
B. Should Extensive Legal Restrictions Be Imposed by the Federal
Government on Recipients of LSC Funding and, If So, What
Restrictions?
Controversy over the issue of restrictions on recipients of LSC fund-
ing has existed throughout the history of the LSC and began even before
the LSC was established by passage of the Legal Services Corporation
Act of 1974.77 This controversy was most intense in the mid-1990s
when Congress was considering more extensive restrictions that
culminated in passage of the Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Ap-
propriations Act of 1996 that added important new restrictions on LSC
recipients, restrictions that are still in effect.78
The usual argument advanced by those favoring a wide range of
restrictions on LSC recipients is that federal funding of legal services for
the poor should be limited to funding legal services for individual per-
sons needing such services, not to promoting political or ideological
causes.79 The existing legal restrictions obviously are helpful in fulfil-
ling this objective by expressly specifying some of the cause-related ac-
75 See, e.g., LSC, JUSTICE GAP, 2009, supra note 1; LSC, JUSTICE GAP, 2005, supra note
1.
76 See BOEHM & FLAHERTY, supra note 63; Eakeley, supra note 70, at 743-44.
77 For the development of the concept of a separate and independent legal services cor-
poration outside the executive branch of government, including the emergence of controversy
over appropriate restrictions on such a corporation, see Warren E. George, Development of the
Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 681-700 (1976). For additional infor-
mation concerning the controversy over the restrictions, see SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 27,
at 2-5. Solomon-Fear's report concerning the background and funding of the Legal Services
Corporation also includes a summary of Congressional actions pertaining to restrictions on
LSC funding. See id. at 6-8.
78 For the restrictions created by the 1996 act, see Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-34, §§ 501-504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1350-59
(1996).
'9 See, e.g., McKay, supra note 72, at 110-13.
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tivities that are prohibited.80 Some who support the existing restrictions
stress that the restrictions merit support because since 1996 these restric-
tions have had a very favorable result.8 ' They assert that once the con-
tentious and bitter dispute over the LSC and its continued existence was
resolved in 1996 with passage of the Omnibus Consolidated Recessions
and Appropriations Act of 1996 an acceptable message emerged.8 2 That
message is that, due to the restrictions, recipients of LSC funding are no
longer engaged in furthering political and ideological causes but are fo-
cused entirely on providing legal services to low-income clients in need
of legal services, who are too poor to pay for the services-an objective
that most Americans approve of.8 3 The new message, it is asserted, has
resulted in eliminating much of the support in Congress for eliminating
the LSC and its funding, and it has also attracted many new and influen-
tial political allies for the LSC and its programs. 84 Very briefly, what the
new messengers are arguing is that retaining the restrictions has had such
favorable consequences for the continued much needed LSC funding of
legal services for the poor that this funding source should not be
threatened by efforts to remove the restrictions.8 5
The new message, however, has not convinced many prominent op-
ponents of the restrictions to abandon their opposition. As one of these
opponents said:
[T]he understandable desire to put a happy face on the
present situation also threatens to obscure the reality of
how legal services function under the system. While
new ideas are needed to expand funding for civil legal
services and to improve the effectiveness of legal ser-
vices programs, and while these ideas should be fully
developed and implemented as appropriate, a focus on
new ideas should not inhibit discussion about the true
80 See id. A few of the restrictions, however, are also indicative of some politically
influential groups favoring exclusion of LSC funding recipients from opposing these groups'
interests in a particular kind of legal proceeding. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (2006)
(regarding abortion proceedings); 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(9) (2006) (regarding desegregation of
any elementary or secondary school or school system).
81 See Mauricio Vivero, From "Renegade" Agency to Institution of Justice: The Trans-
formation of Legal Services Corporation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323, 1325 (2002). When
his article was published Vivero was Vice President for Governmental Relations and Public
Affairs at the Legal Services Corporation. See id. at 1323.
82 See id. at 1339-45; see also James D. Lorenz, Jr., Almost the Last Word on Legal
Services: Congress Can Do Pretty Much What It Likes, 17 Sr. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 295,
318-19 (1998); McKay, supra note 72.
83 See Vivero, supra note 81, at 1339-45.
84 See id. at 1343-44.
85 See id.
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impact of the restrictions and about strategies to obtain
their rescission. 86
Other opponents of the restrictions have continued their opposition be-
cause they consider the restrictions serious impediments that must even-
tually be removed. One such opponent condemns them as silencing
doctrines that prevent attorneys from advocating for many poor people in
need of legal services, but who have no recourse to non-LSC advo-
cates. 87 Another opponent asserts that "the[ ] restrictions cannot be justi-
fied as reasonable limitations, nor is there any compelling rationale for
most of them."88 He then adds:
To remove existing restrictions and prevent new re-
strictions from being added, the civil legal assistance
community will have to build a broad base of support
among federal and state legislative bodies and the public
for the need for advocacy beyond advice on legal repre-
sentation in individual cases. In order to build broad
public support, it is critical to reach beyond bar leaders
to state and local leaders, the press, businesses, labor,
and human services and civic organizations.89
Restrictions perceived by many of the opponents as having especially
adverse consequences for legal services programs serving the poor are
the prohibition on lobbying of government bodies by LSC recipients of
its funding, the prohibition on LSC recipients bringing class actions, and
the prohibition on LSC-funded recipients providing legal assistance in
86 David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Vir-
ginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 337, 367-68 (1998). Else-
where Udell has expressed similar opposition to the restrictions. See David S. Udell,
Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government Grants for Lawyering for
the Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 902 (1998) [hereinafter Udell, Implications] ("In light
of LSC's auspicious origins, the restrictions that Congress imposed on Legal Services lawyers
in its 1996 appropriation are a flagrant betrayal of the ideal of equal justice under the law.").
87 See David Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Inter-
est Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REv. 209, 222 (2003).
88 Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking Back
and Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1230 (2002). Alan Houseman was the
director of the Center for Law and Social Policy when he wrote his article, a position he still
holds. Early in his career he created and directed the Research Institute at the LSC. He has
written extensively on legal aid and has published far more articles concerning the LSC than
any other author.
89 Id. at 1232. For a similar position, see Robert R. Kuehn, Undermining Justice: The
Legal Profession's Role in Restricting Access to Legal Representation, 2006 UTAH L. REv.
1039, 1079 (2006) (concluding that "[tihe legal profession must cease to be an accomplice in
efforts to provide 'liberty and justice for some.' The profession cannot paradoxically proclaim
its commitment to access to legal representation and yet subvert that very goal by imposing
restrictions on unpopular clients or types of legal services. If the principles of the legal profes-
sion mean anything, then all lawyers, courts, and bar organizations need to fight to ensure
access to justice is truly equal and without restrictions.").
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most fee-generating cases. 90 Some opponents have concentrated their
opposition on one or more of these restrictions. 91 Other opponents con-
sider some of the restrictions to be unconstitutional, and believe that
more litigation is needed challenging these unconstitutional restrictions
in court.92 So far there have been few court cases challenging the consti-
tutionality of any of the restrictions, and only one of them, Legal Ser-
vices Corporation v. Velazquez,9 3 has had any appreciable invalidation
impact. In Velazquez, the U.S. Supreme Court held the statutory restric-
tion prohibiting LSC grantees from challenging existing welfare laws to
be an unconstitutional First Amendment violation. 9 4 There also are op-
ponents who assert that some of the restrictions should be eliminated
because they prevent lawyers funded by the LSC from complying with
rules of professional responsibility that all U.S. lawyers must abide by. 9 5
As committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
concluded in a report urging elimination of the restrictions: restrictions
on the steps that an attorney can take on behalf of a client and the advice
an attorney can render "conflict with the basic ethical precepts requiring
90 See, e.g., BRENNAN GTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: How CONGRESS
LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER (2000), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
3cbbeedd52806583blosm6blo8g.pdf.
91 See Henry Rose, Class Actions and the Poor, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 55, 67-73 (2007).
92 See Ilisabeth Smith Bornstein, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693, 694-97; Jessica A. Roth, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A
Constitutional Challenge to the 1996 Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107, 107-11 (1998) (arguing that the restrictions violate the First
Amendment by prohibiting certain types of litigation and political activity and asserting that
the restrictions violate the equal protection component of the Constitution because of their
negative impact on the poor); Udell, Implications, supra note 86, at 908-19 (arguing that some
of the restrictions violate First Amendment rights).
93 531 U.S. 533 (2000).
94 See id. at 540-49. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996 imposed the restriction prohibiting challenges to existing welfare laws. This restriction
prohibits the LSC from funding any organization:
that initiates legal representation or participates in any other way, in litigation, lob-
bying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare sys-
tem, except that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from
representing an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a wel-
fare agency if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge
existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation.
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-34,
§ 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321, 1355-56 (1996). For a detailed analysis of the Velasquez case, a
5-4 decision, see Bornstein, supra note 92, at 697-99. On the limited impact of the Velazquez
case, see Houseman, supra note 88, at 1232-33.
95 See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., A Call for the Repeal or Invalidation of
Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services Lawyers, 53 RECORD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 13, 55 (1998).
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an attorney to act in the client's best interest, to represent the client zeal-
ously and to exercise independent professional judgment." 96
Proposal
Additional legal restrictions should not be imposed on activities of
recipients of LSC funds, and existing restrictions imposed by federal
statutes pertaining to the LSC should be eliminated. These restrictions
unjustifiably prevent many poor persons in need of legal services from
receiving such services, and they prevent many kinds of impact action by
those restricted that would help reduce the shortage in legal services for
the poor.
C. How Much Should the Federal Government Appropriate Each
Year for the LSC?
Controversy over the amount of LSC funding has occurred most
every year during the annual federal budgeting and appropriations pro-
cess, and most every year the LSC competes with many other requests
for federal funding. It is obvious to most everyone who requests sub-
stantial funding from the federal government that the federal government
will not provide sufficient funding to fully fund all requests, that some
requests will be denied, and that some will be considered higher priority
than others. Recognizing that sufficient federal funding will not be forth-
coming to enable LSC recipients to close the gap in needed civil legal
services for the poor, LSC proponents keep pushing for what they per-
ceive is a justifiable share of the annual federal budget in enabling LSC
recipients to reduce the gap. Some of the opponents of the LSC have
argued that the LSC should receive no federal funding, thereby abolish-
ing it.97 But the most frequent opposition to LSC funding apparently has
not been that such funding should be totally eliminated, but that it should
be more limited in amount than what the LSC is requesting, so as to add
to federal funding needs perceived by some funding proponents to be of
higher priority than civil legal services for the poor-needs such as
health care, housing, national defense, or reversing serious declines in
96 Id. For a discussion of the professional ethics issues raised by the congressional re-
strictions on LSC-funded lawyers at length, see Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders
and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 FoRDnAM L. REv. 2187, 2240 (1999) ("The restrictions do
make it difficult for legal services attorneys to act ethically, and do force LSC recipients to
refuse cases that should be taken or to withdraw from ongoing representation that is essential
to vindicate the rights of low-income persons eligible for legal services. . . . Because of the
danger that future restrictions will force attorneys into ethical dilemmas requiring withdrawal,
and because many of the restrictions on the type of client and the scope of representation are
unjustified under the principles of equal access to justice, every possible effort must be made
to remove such existing restrictions and prevent future restrictions from being imposed.").
97 See Kilwein, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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the national economy. Federal funding of the LSC, as commonly occurs
when most every kind of government funding proposal is made, involves
competition with other funding proponents.
Proposal
The federal government should appropriate for the LSC at least as
much as the $400 million it appropriated in fiscal year 199598 adjusted
for inflation since 1995. This would amount to about $600 million in
2010, an appropriation far below what is needed, but a reasonable sum
given the multitude of legitimate and meritorious demands that will be
made on the federal budget, most of which, if federally-funded, will also
be far less than what is needed.
II. ISSUES CONCERNING INTEREST ON LAWYER TRUST AccouNT
(IOLTA) PROGRAMS
In most states, interest on lawyers' trust accounts, commonly re-
ferred to as IOLTA accounts, has been an important and often controver-
sial issue concerning the funding of adequate legal services for the poor.
Most law firms in the United States maintain a separate IOLTA account
in a financial institution, and each firm deposits in this account client
funds for very short periods of time, a few days or less, before distribut-
ing the funds to the clients. 99 Most of these accounts are in banks but
some are in other financial institutions, such as savings and loans. 10 In-
terest rates on IOLTA accounts frequently fluctuate due to market influ-
ences. Typical funds received by the law firm for transfer to the client
are payments for sale of real property, when the law firm represented the
seller, or payment of a judgment sum awarded to the client. However,
such client funds, or a portion of them, may be retained by the firm as
payment for fees or expenses owed the firm by the client. Funds of a
client deposited in an IOLTA account are promptly forwarded by the
firm to the client entitled to the funds.10' Each firm has only one account
for funds of all its clients, each of whom is entitled to promptly receive
the amount deposited and over which there is no controversy as to the
client's right to payment or prompt payment. Such a multi-client fund
account is generally referred to, and in this Article referred to, as an
IOLTA account. If a controversy exists as to the right of the client to
98 Adjusted for inflation, the 1995 appropriation for the LSC would be the largest appro-
priation that has been made for the LSC. For annual LSC appropriations that have been made,
not adjusted for inflation, see supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
99 See Katharine L. Smith, IOLTA In The Balance: The Battle of Legality and Morality
Between Robin Hood and the Miser, 34 ST. MARY's L.J. 969, 975-77 (2003).
100 See, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.15(o).
101 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.15(a) (2010).
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payment or prompt payment, the law firm must open a separate account
in which only those funds, no other funds, are deposited.102 Such an
account is not an IOLTA account. Maintaining one such account for all
clients is far more efficient and less costly than opening and quickly clos-
ing a separate bank account for each payment received by the firm for
prompt transmission to each separate client. 03 Failure of a law firm to
properly safeguard the rights of a client or any others whose funds have
been deposited in an IOLTA account can result in the lawyers responsi-
ble for the improper action being sanctioned for unprofessional
conduct. 104
IOLTA accounts are interest-bearing accounts. 0 5 Who receives
this interest and how much of the interest have been controversial issues
since the early 1980s, when, by federal statute, banks and savings and
loans were authorized to make interest payments on demand deposits, the
beneficial interest in which is held by nonprofit individuals or organiza-
tions engaged in charitable type activities. The federal statute also au-
thorized law firms to make withdrawals from such accounts for the
purpose of making transfers to third persons. 106 Shortly after these statu-
tory authorizations some states established IOLTA programs for allocat-
ing much of the interest on lawyer trust accounts to organizations
engaged in charitable type activities, including nonprofit lawyer organi-
zations engaged in providing legal services for the poor, or otherwise
expanding or clarifying legal rights of the poor. 107 Florida was the first
state to establish an IOLTA program. 108 Other states soon followed, and
every state now has such a program.' 09 By court rule or statute-in most
102 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.15(e) (2010).
103 See Tarra L. Morris, Note, The Dog in the Manger: The First Twenty-Five Years of
War on IOLTA, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 605, 611-20 (2005).
104 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2010). Many states have adopted
this as a court rule, with some states modifying and adding provisions to the rule. This ABA
rule imposes professional obligations on a lawyer as to safeguarding funds or other property,
of clients or others, in the lawyers' possession; this includes funds that have been deposited in
a client trust account. See id. Failure of the lawyer to comply with the obligations imposed by
Rule 1.15 can result in the lawyer being sanctioned and, if the violations are considered serious
enough, even disbarred. See id.
105 Morris, supra note 103, at 607.
106 See id. at 607-08; see also Consumer Checking Account Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1832
(2006). On this 1980 legislation and its effect on lawyer trust accounts for clients, see the
majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
159-161 (1998). Prior to 1980 lawyer trust accounts and other bank checking accounts were
prohibited by federal law from paying interest.
107 See Morris, supra note 103, at 607.
108 On the origins of Florida's IOLTA program, see Arthur J. England Jr. & Russell E.
Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56 FLA. B.J. 101 (Feb. 1982).
109 Morris, supra note 103, at 608. For a discussion on other countries that also have
IOLTA-type programs, see England & Carlisle, supra note 108, at 102-03; Johnson, supra
note 8, at 730-31.
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states by court rule-every state requires each law firm in the state to
have a bank or other financial institution trust account for client funds
that the law firm possesses.o10 State laws also require that banks or other
institutions with IOLTA accounts periodically distribute the IOLTA pro-
gram's share of interest on these accounts to a particular public or non-
profit agency authorized to receive and distribute these funds for legal
services to the poor and other legally designated purposes."' The inter-
est on IOLTA accounts has long been ruled excludable from the client's
or law firm's gross taxable income, which has added to the support for
IOLTA.11 2 IOLTA income allocated to legal services for the poor or
other charitable purposes totaled $215 million in 2008,113 a considerable
decline from recent previous years. The principal reasons for the decline
obviously were a lower total volume of funds in IOLTA accounts due to
the effect of the recession in reducing the number and the dollar amount
of transactions by law firms that result in IOLTA account deposits and
also a reduction in the amount of interest that many banks were paying
on IOLTA accounts compared to what they were paying on comparable
accounts.
IOLTA programs have generated considerable controversy, as is to
be expected, as they take interest belonging to individual clients and give
110 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 221-22 (2003). In most states
this requirement is imposed by a court rule that is the same or similar to ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.15. In some states, the rule also includes additional regulatory
coverage. ABA Rule 1.15, in part, is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own prop-
erty. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the
lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third
person ....
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated
in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer
shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that
the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in
which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the
property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The law-
yer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are
not in dispute.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (2010). For state statutes on law firm maintenance
of IOLTA accounts see, for example, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211 (2010); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-81c (West 2010); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.09 (West 2006); N.Y. JUDI-
CIARY LAW § 487 (McKinney 2005).
1I1 See infra notes 146, 148-52 and accompanying text.
112 See I.R.C. § 642(c)(1) (2006); Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
113 LSC FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 15, at 8.
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it to others.114 Moreover, the ultimate recipients of these interest pay-
ments spend them for authorized purposes that often are controversial.' 15
The reason that the interest on lawyer trust accounts is not paid to each
client whose funds are earning the interest is that it would be too costly
to ascertain how much of the interest on each such account belongs to
each client whose funds were briefly deposited in the account.116 The
technology currently exists to make such calculations but the calculations
would cost more than each client's share of the interest, a share that
usually is less than five or ten dollars." 7 Technological advances may
occur in the future that would greatly reduce this client share calculation
cost, but such technology does not exist today.
The following are particularly troublesome and controversial issues
concerning the IOLTA program and they are separately considered in the
pages that follow: (1) whether IOLTA programs are constitutional; (2)
whether participation in IOLTA programs should be mandatory for all
law firms that have IOLTA accounts, or should it be discretionary with
each such law firm; (3) to what programs and what recipients should
IOLTA funds be allocated; (4) whether the banks and other financial
institutions with IOLTA accounts should be required to pay interest or
dividends on those accounts at comparable rates to what the institutions
pay on similar non-IOLTA accounts. These controversial issues com-
monly emerged when the adoption of an IOLTA program was first being
considered by a state's courts or legislature. They have thereafter been
intermittently controversial due to efforts to legally terminate or legally
modify the existing programs, or to influence how they are administered.
The federal government has also become heavily involved in some of
these controversies, most notably the U.S. Supreme Court in its decisions
on whether or not IOLTA programs violate the U.S. Constitution.' 18
A. Are IOLTA Programs Constitutional?
The issue as to constitutionality of IOLTA programs has focused
primarily on whether IOLTA programs violate the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.119 The key questions that the
courts have dealt with in deciding whether the interest on IOLTA ac-
114 See Morris, supra note 103, at 607-08.
115 See Kilwein, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
116 See Brown v. Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 225 (2003) (quoting IOLTA Adoption Or-
der, 102 Wash.2d 1101 (1984)).
117 For example, estimated interest was only $4.96 on a $90,521.29 deposit in an IOLTA
account in which one of the parties in a recent lead case on the constitutionality of IOLTA
accounts was involved. See id. at 229-30. The party in question is one of the parties who was
challenging the constitutionality of IOLTA accounts in the Brown case. See id. at 229.
118 See, e.g., Brown v. Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 225 (2003); Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
119 See, e.g., Phillips, 524 U.S. at 156.
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counts violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause are these: is the
interest the private property of the owner of the principal, the client
whose funds are earning the interest?; if the interest does belong to the
owner of the principal, does paying it to others constitute a Fifth Amend-
ment taking?; and, if there has been a Fifth Amendment taking, have the
owners of the principal been provided with just compensation.12 0 The
U.S. Supreme Court considered these questions in Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation, a 5-4 decision.12 1 Petitioners in the Phillips case al-
leged that the Texas IOLTA program, a typical IOLTA program, violated
the Fifth Amendment. 1 22 The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that interest earned on an IOLTA account
is the private property of the owner of the principal, the client whose
funds are deposited in the account. 12 3 And it is the private property of
the owner of the principal even though it lacks positive economic or mar-
ket value to the owner, as "possession, control and disposition are none-
theless valuable rights that inhere in the property." 1 24 However, the
majority refused to rule on whether interest generated by IOLTA funds
has been taken from its owners in violation of the Fifth Amendment's
Taking Clause or on the amount of any just compensation owed the re-
spondents in the Phillips case.12 5 The majority opinion refused to rule on
these questions because they were not raised in the petition for certiorari,
and it is the court's practice to consider only questions set forth in the
petition for certiorari. 12 6
The Phillips opinion created great concern among those receiving
and distributing IOLTA funds as to what the inevitable future U.S. Su-
preme Court decision would be on the constitutional takings and com-
pensation questions that the majority opinion in the Phillips case refused
to answer. 12 7 There was even some concern that the officers and board
members of distributees of IOLTA funds would be personally responsi-
ble for distributions of IOLTA funds that a later opinion might classify as
unconstitutional takings.
The inevitable U.S. Supreme Court opinion was handed down in
2003. The majority opinion in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washing-
ton, a 5-4 decision, was written by Justice Stevens, with the dissenting
120 See, e.g., id.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 172.
124 Id. at 169-70.
125 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 n.4.
126 Id.
127 See Morris, supra note 103, at 614-15.
2011] 595
596 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:571
opinions written by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 128 The majority in the
Brown case held that the interest earned on an IOLTA account that was
allocated to legal services for needy persons constituted a taking as that
term is used in the Fifth Amendment but was not a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.129 The last clause of the Fifth Amendment states that
"property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,"13 0
and the allocation of interest earned on an IOLTA account to legal ser-
vices for needy persons is a taking for a public use. 131 But the majority
held that the allocation of interest from an IOLTA account to legal ser-
vices for the needy does not unconstitutionally deprive each client (each
owner of principal in an IOLTA account) of just compensation required
by the Fifth Amendment. 132 No unconstitutional deprivation occurred
because each client's funds generated no net income to the client, as the
cost of ascertaining and distributing that interest to the individual client
owning the funds on which the interest is owed would be greater than the
amount of the interest. 133 The monetary loss to the individual client is
nil, so the Fifth Amendment requires no compensation to any such cli-
ent.134 Even if the best modern technology is used in determining the
interest on each client's share, the cost is greater than the amount of that
interest. Contributing to the high calculation cost is the short period of
time in which each client's fund is in the IOLTA account (usually only a
few days and often only overnight) the substantial number of different
client funds that are in an IOLTA account at any one time (in many
IOLTA accounts hundreds of such funds), and variations among the
funds in amount and duration of deposit. If a client fund is held by a law
firm for client distribution and the client fund is big enough or held long
enough to result in net interest to be allocated to the client, the law firm
is legally obligated to deposit the fund in a separate account in which
other funds are not deposited.135 It is quite possible that future advances
in technology will enable the net interest on each client fund to be ascer-
tainable at a low enough cost that the net interest must be paid to the
client. This will result in an elimination of the net interest on IOLTA
128 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003). For a discussion on the
Phillips and Brown decisions, see Morris, supra note 103, at 611-20; Smith, supra note 99, at
989-1001.
129 Brown, 538 U.S. at 240-41.
130 U.S. CONST. amend V.
131 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 232.
132 See id. at 235-40.
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 Typical of the very small amount of interest earned on a client fund deposited in an
IOLTA account is the estimated interest on the client fund of one of the parties in the Brown
case who asserted that IOLTA accounts are unconstitutional. The total interest that this party
estimated has been earned on his fund of $90,521.29 deposited for two days in an IOLTA
account was $4.96. Id. at 229-30 (1993).
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accounts as a source of funding of legal services for the poor or other
charitable purposes, unless the client owners choose to donate the inter-
est for such purposes. 136
Although the Brown decision appears to have resolved the contro-
versy over IOLTA programs' compliance with the Fifth Amendment,' 3 7
IOLTA programs remain vulnerable to attack as violating freedom of
speech and association rights protected by the First Amendment. Justice
Kennedy referred to this vulnerability in his dissenting opinion in the
Brown case.138 In that opinion he makes this observation:
The First Amendment consequences of the state's action
have not been addressed in this case, but the potential for
a serious violation is there. . . . Today's holding, then, is
doubly unfortunate. One constitutional violation (the
taking of property) likely will lead to another (compelled
speech). These matters may have to come before the
Court in due course.139
The First Amendment argument, as briefly summarized by the U.S. First
Circuit Court of Appeals in a 1993 opinion, is that the rule on how
IOLTA account interest must be distributed "burdens protected speech
by forcing expression, [by clients whose funds are in IOLTA accounts]
through compelled support of organizations espousing ideologies or en-
gaging in political activities," and the rule does not serve compelling
state interests.140 However, the court in this 1993 opinion held that the
interest generated by the client funds does not belong to the clients, so
the clients have not been compelled to contribute their money to the
IOLTA program recipients. 141 As to ownership of interest on client
funds in IOLTA accounts, although the U.S. Supreme Court a few years
later, in the Phillips case, took a contrary position on who owns the inter-
est on an IOLTA account,142 it has never considered the IOLTA First
Amendment issue. So it seems quite likely, as Justice Kennedy infers in
his Brown dissent, 143 that the U.S. Supreme Court may later take up and
136 Justice Stevens, in his Brown case majority opinion, mentions the prospect of future
advances in technology but concludes that under the State of Washington court rule regulating
IOLTA programs, such advances would have no effect on the constitutionality of IOLTA
programs in Washington; that rule is "self-adjusting and is adequately designed to accommo-
date changes in banking technology without running afoul of the state or federal constitutions."
Brown, 538 U.S. at 227.
137 See Brown, 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
138 See id. at 253 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139 Id.
140 Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 977 (1993).
141 See id. at 980.
142 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
143 See Brown, 538 U.S. at 253 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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resolve the First Amendment issue as to distribution of interest on client
funds in IOLTA accounts." 4
No proposal is advanced in this Article as to the constitutionality of
IOLTA programs. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington seems to have permanently resolved the Fifth
Amendment constitutionality of IOLTA programs. 145 But the U.S. Su-
preme Court has not as yet ruled on the First Amendment constitutional-
ity of IOLTA programs and it appears unlikely that it will do so any time
soon. Moreover, if the opportunity is sufficiently delayed the issue may
become moot due to possible advances in technology that result in the
net interest on each client fund to be ascertainable at a low enough cost
for that net interest to be paid to the client. If such an advance in tech-
nology occurs IOLTA programs will then disappear.
B. To What Programs and What Recipients Should IOLTA Funds Be
Allocated?
Most states have dealt with the IOLTA funds allocation issue by a
court rule or statute that requires the distributing agency to allocate
IOLTA funds for certain programs or to certain kinds of recipients.146 In
144 On First Amendment challenges to IOLTA, see Morris, supra note 103, at 621-24.
Morris also considers another legal argument against IOLTA-that it is a veiled and improper
tax. Id. at 625-30.
145 See Brown, 538 U.S. 216.
146 For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court established the Lawyer Trust Account
Board, Minnesota's distributing agency, via a court rule. See MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DucT R. 1. 15(o)(1) (2010). The Lawyer Trust Account Board has been granted very extensive
authority to determine which recipients shall receive IOLTA funds. The Minnesota Rules of
Lawyer Trust Account Board Rule 2, provides as follows: "(c) Disbursement of funds. The
Board shall, by grants and appropriations it deems appropriate, disburse funds for the tax
exempt public purpose which the Board may prescribe from time to time consistent with Inter-
nal Revenue Code Regulations and rulings, including those under Section 501(c)(3)." MINN.
R. LAWYER TRUST AccouNT BD. R. 2(c).
The distributing agency in New York is the Board of Trustees of the New York Interest
on Lawyer Account (IOLA) Fund, a fiduciary fund in the custody of the state comptroller.
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97v-1 (McKinney 2009). On fund distribution, the relevant statute
states the following:
b. No less than seventy-five percent of the total funds distributed in any fiscal
year shall be allocated to not-for-profit tax-exempt providers for the purpose of de-
livering civil legal services to the poor. The funds distributed annually to legal ser-
vices providers shall be allocated according to the geographical distribution of poor
persons throughout the state based on the latest available figures from the United
States department of commerce, bureau of census, as prescribed by rules and regula-
tions of the board of trustees.
c. The remaining funds shall be allocated for purposes related to the improve-
ment of the administration of justice, including, but not limited to, the provision of
civil legal services to groups currently underserved by legal services, such as the
elderly and the disabled, and the enhancement of civil legal services to the poor
through innovative and cost-effective means, such as volunteer lawyer programs and
support and training services.
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many states the distributing agency also receives funds from other
sources that it distributes to recipients. The policy obviously is to use
IOLTA funds for worthy causes that are in need of added funding. But
the states vary considerably as to which programs or recipients should
receive IOLTA funds, although recipients who provide legal services to
the poor in civil law matters universally are one kind of authorized recip-
ient and, in most all states, receive a majority of the available IOLTA
funding. 14 7 Examples of other statutory or court rule-authorized uses of
IOLTA funds in some states are law school legal clinic programs, 14 8 law
student loans or scholarships,14 9 education of lay persons in legal and
justice-related areas, 150 and improvement of the administration of jus-
tice.' 5 1 Administrative costs of the distributing agency also are quite
universally authorized uses of IOLTA funds. 15 2
In determining who receives funding and how much each recipient
should receive, the distributing agency often is confronted with difficult
issues. Examples of such issues are these: what priority, if any, should
legal services for the poor be given over other organizations or programs
that the agency is authorized to fund? What percentage of available fund-
ing should be allocated to each general purpose legal services organiza-
tion in the state that provides legal services to the poor? Should legal
service organizations in the state that provide legal services only to a
limited group of poor persons-such as juveniles, the physically dis-
abled, or immigrants-be funded and, if funded, what percentage of
available funding? Resolving these issues can be highly controversial
among those within the distributing agency who make allocation deci-
sions, as each of the organizations or purposes is meritorious and in need
of additional funding.
State court rules or statutes in many states limit the decision making
responsibilities of the distributing agency in their state by imposing per-
centage limits on how much funding should be awarded particular kinds
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 97v-3 (McKinney 2009).
147 Some commentators are strongly opposed to allocation of IOLTA funds to recipients
other than those providing legal services for the poor. See, e.g., Arthur J. England, Jr., Modem
Day Alchemy: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, in CIVIL JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE
1990s 563, 566-67 ("A . . . threat to IOLTA programs has been the effort by some state
legislatures to divert IOLTA funds from their designated purposes to other legislative
priorities.").
148 See, e.g., PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(h)(2) (2010).
149 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-81c(a)(2) (West 2010); FLA. BAR FOUNDATION
CHARTER art. 2.1(h)(2).
150 See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:28A-4(b)(3) (2010).
151 See, e.g., FLA. BAR FOUND. CHARTER art. 2.1(h)(3); N.J. CT. R. 1:28A-4(b)(2) (2010).
152 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 62.16(a) (West 2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.5(s)(3) (2010).
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of recipients.' 53 The distributing agency in most states also is subject to
oversight by the state supreme court or some other body as to the
agency's operations, including its distribution to recipients.154 The over-
sight body can influence and presumably even determine who receives
IOLTA funds and how much each recipient receives. 55
Proposal
IOLTA funds should be allocated only to those individuals or orga-
nizations providing legal services to the poor, informing poor persons of
their legal rights, assisting poor persons to represent themselves pro se,
and the administrative expenses of the distributing agency and the recipi-
ents of IOLTA funds. The distributing agency should determine who
receives how much available IOLTA funds, but should be subject to con-
tinuing meaningful oversight by the state's supreme court.
C. Should Participation in IOLTA Programs Be Mandatory, Opt-out,
or Voluntary for Each Law Firm with One or More IOLTA
Accounts?
This issue has been controversial at one time or another in many
states since the early 1980s when IOLTA programs were first estab-
153 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6216(b)(1) (West 2003); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW
§ 97v (McKinney 2009).
154 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6145 (West 2003) (requiring the state bar to
submit an annual financial statement and audit to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
California, the State Assembly, and Senate Committees on the Judiciary); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 51-81c(e) (West 2010) (providing that oversight is by a five-member advisory panel
that reports to the state legislature and Chief Court Administrator, and whose functions are
these: "(e) The advisory panel shall: (1) consult with and make recommendations to the tax-
exempt organization administering the program regarding the implementation and administra-
tion of the program, including the methods of allocation and the allocation of funds to be
disbursed under the program; (2) review and evaluate, and monitor the impact of the program;
and (3) report on the program to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having
cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary and to the Chief Court Administrator, as may
from time to time be requested."); N.J. CT. R. 1:28A-3(a) (requiring the state bar to submit an
annual report to the State Supreme Court, including an annual audit reviewing in detail the
administration of the IOLTA fund during the previous year); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.15(q) (2010) (noting that disbursement and allocation of IOLTA Funds shall be subject to
the prior approval of the Supreme Court, thus requiring that the IOLTA Board submit to the
Supreme Court for its approval a copy of the Board's audited statement of financial affairs,
clearly setting forth in detail all funds previously approved for disbursement under the IOLTA
program, and a copy of the IOLTA Board's proposed annual budget, designating the uses to
which IOLTA funds are recommended). However, a statutory proposal of possible benefit to
the banks was rejected. It was that the advisory panel would consist of ten members, three of
whom "shall be appointed by the co-chairpersons of the joint standing committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly having cognizance of matters related to banking, which members shall re-
present the interests of banks in this state and which members shall have experience in deposit-
related functions as an employee or former employee of a banking institution in this state."
Gen. Assem., S.B. 1142 (d) (Conn. 2007).
155 See N.J. Ct. R. Rule 1:28A-4(b)(2) (2010).
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lished. In states with a mandatory program, all law firms with one or
more IOLTA accounts must participate in the IOLTA program. 1 56 In
opt-out states, each law firm with one or more IOLTA accounts must
participate in the IOLTA program unless it decides not to and notifies a
designated agency of its decision. In a voluntary state, if a law firm with
one or more IOLTA accounts decides not to participate in the IOLTA
program, it need not do so, and need not notify any agency of its deci-
sion.15 7 In some opt-out states, each year at a designated date law firms
with IOLTA accounts may elect to opt-out of the IOLTA program. 15 8 In
most states, IOLTA programs initially were opt-out or voluntary, but in
1988 the ABA strongly recommended that all states adopt mandatory
programs, 159 and this helped influence more states to do so. Currently
most states have mandatory programs; only one state, South Dakota, has
a voluntary program; and the number of opt-out states has been
declining. 160
The major advantage of mandatory IOLTA is that it assures more
funding for legal services for the poor and other authorized meritorious
purposes. Some arguments against mandatory IOLTA that have influ-
enced some law firms and other interest groups to oppose it are the in-
creased administrative and record-keeping burdens that mandatory
IOLTA imposes on law firms, the funding of some programs that some
law firms and some law firm clients are opposed to, and it permits
IOLTA funds to be used for initiating and litigating class actions and
lawsuits against government agencies-proceedings opposed by many
conservative interest groups.16 1
156 See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(b) (2010); N.J. RULES PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (2010); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15A(c) (2009).
157 See, e.g., S.D. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.15(d)(4), (e)(1) (2008).
158 See, e.g., DEL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.15(k)(1) (2008); N.M. RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT R. 16-115D(8) (2008). Justice Kogan favored a unique form of opt-out in his dis-
senting opinion in In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 538 So.2d 448, 454 (Fla. 1989), a case
which required creation of a mandatory IOLTA program in Florida. Justice Kogan's opt-out
program would allow a client, by an affirmative act, to prevent the use of his or her account
funds for the IOLTA program. He concluded, "[T]hose clients who do not want to pay the
legal fees of those persons whose financial and philosophical pursuits are adverse to their
interests need not be required to contribute thereto." Id.
159 See AM. BAR Ass'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 101 (1988).
160 Alabama, Maine, and Missouri are among the states that have recently shifted from
opt-out to mandatory programs. However, Missouri's mandatory program has an unusual ex-
ception: a lawyer or law firm is exempted if it "establishes that no eligible institution within
reasonable proximity to his, her or its office offers IOLTA accounts." Mo. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-1.15(i)(5)(B) (2008).
161 This latter argument was the determining factor that prevented the Texas legislature
from adopting a mandatory IOLTA requirement in 1983. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 736.
The next year, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a court rule creating an IOLTA program, but
excepted most class action lawsuits, lawsuits against governmental agencies, and lobbying
efforts for any candidate or issue. Id. at 737, 742. For a summary of arguments against
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Proposal
Participation in an IOLTA program should be mandatory, with no
opt-out for any law firm with one or more IOLTA accounts. The needs
that IOLTA programs help fulfill are so great that all law firms with
IOLTA accounts should be legally required to participate even though
participation may add some costs to the law firms or the IOLTA funds
may be used for programs that the firms oppose.
D. Should Banks and Other Financial Institutions with IOLTA
Accounts Be Required to Pay Interest or Dividends on Those
Accounts at Rates Comparable to What the Institutions Pay
on Comparable Non-IOLTA Accounts?
Whether banks and other financial institutions with IOLTA ac-
counts should be required to pay interest or dividends on those accounts
at rates comparable to what such institutions pay on comparable non-
IOLTA accounts has been another highly controversial IOLTA-related
issue. For some years, many banks and other financial institutions with
IOLTA accounts paid considerably less in interest or dividends on these
accounts than what they paid on comparable non-IOLTA accounts.
About half the states now have a comparability requirement. This re-
quirement is that financial institutions with IOLTA accounts must pay on
those accounts the highest interest rate or dividend generally available at
the institution to other accounts when the IOLTA accounts meet the
same minimum balance or other qualifications. 16 2 Reasonable service
fees, however, may be charged by financial institutions on their IOLTA
accounts.' 63 Some financial institutions with IOLTA accounts waive the
service fees as a gesture of cooperation with the IOLTA program.' 6
mandatory IOLTA in Florida, see In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 538 So.2d 448, 454 (Fla.
1989).
162 See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuct R. 1.15(g)(3)(A) (2010) ("eligible institu-
tion shall pay no less on its IOLTA accounts than the highest interest rate or dividend gener-
ally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers when the IOLTA account meets
or exceeds the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications on its non-IOLTA
accounts, if any"); FLA. CT. R. 5-1.1(g)(5)(A), (B); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 497-6.b (McKin-
ney 2005). On the impact of comparability requirements, see Terry Carter, Expressing Their
Interest: Rise in Rates Swells IOLTA, and Legal Services Gain, 93 A.B.A. J. 22 (2007).
163 See, e.g., Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4-1.15(b) (providing that: "'[A]llowable
reasonable fees' are per check charges, per deposit charges, a fee in lieu of minimum balance,
sweep fees, and a reasonable IOLTA account administrative fee. Allowable reasonable fees
may be deducted from interest or dividends earned on an IOLTA account, provided that such
charges or fees shall be calculated in accordance with an eligible institution's standard practice
for non-IOLTA customers.").
164 Some states expressly authorize, but do not require, waiver of service charges by insti-
tutions with IOLTA accounts-an obvious attempt to encourage waiver. See, e.g., ME. BAR R.
6(a)(4)(C)(2) (2010) ("[N]othing contained in this Rule [the rule on IOLTA interest and divi-
dend rates] shall be deemed to prohibit an institution from paying a higher interest rate or
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Proposal
Every state should adopt a legal requirement that every bank or
other financial institution doing business in the state (that includes open-
ing and maintaining IOLTA accounts) should pay interest on IOLTA ac-
counts that is the same or higher than what the bank or other financial
institution is paying on comparable accounts. However, the financial in-
stitutions should be permitted to charge reasonable service fees for both
IOLTA and comparable accounts.
Given the need for increased funding of legal services for the poor,
financial institutions with IOLTA accounts should not be permitted to
benefit more extensively from IOLTA accounts than from comparable
accounts.
III. ISSUES CONCERNING PRO BoNo LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR
Pro bono legal services-legal services provided at no fee to poor
persons and other worthy clients or worthy causes-has long been con-
sidered an acceptable and generally commendable practice when per-
formed voluntarily by lawyers, including lawyers actively engaged in the
practice of law.165 There is some evidence that a majority of U.S. law-
yers, including many lawyers in large law firms, have each year in the
recent past provided some pro bono legal services to the poor, or to orga-
nizations serving the poor.166 But there are many, including many within
dividend on IOLTA accounts than required by this Rule or from electing to waive any fees and
service charges on 1OLTA accounts than required by this Rule or from electing to waive any
fees and service charges on an IOLTA account.").
165 On the history of pro bono legal services, see ABA COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB.
SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONo WORK OF AMERICA'S LAWYERS
6-7 (2005) [hereinafter ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE]; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO
IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS 3-6 (2005) [hereinafter
RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE]. On the history of the pro bono ethical and
professional obligations of lawyers, see Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers
Pro Bono Responsibilities, 77 TULANE L. REV. 91 (2002). On the increased institutionaliza-
tion of pro bono over the past quarter century, see Cummings, supra note 4 at 6-41.
166 See, e.g., ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 165. This report summarizes the
results of a study by the American Bar Association Committee on the pro bono activity of a
sample of full-time practicing lawyers throughout the United States during a year-long period
ending in November 2004. The sample consisted of 1100 responding lawyers and included
lawyers in private practice (81 %), house counsel (9%), government (8%), and academia
(11%). Id. at 9. Those lawyers selected were interviewed by telephone. Among the findings
of the report are:
* Two thirds of respondents (66%) reported doing some level of free pro bono
service to people of limited means and/or organizations serving the poor. Id. at 4
* Attorneys surveyed, on average, reported providing approximately 39 hours of
free pro bono legal services to organizations serving the poor. Id.
* The main discouragement from doing-or doing more-pro bono, is a lack of
time (69%). Other disincentives include employer-related issues (15%), such as
billable hours expectations, and the lack of specific expertise or skills in the re-
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the legal profession, who are of the opinion that lawyers engaged in the
practice of law should be doing more pro bono work, and that more poor
people in need of legal services should receive the services they need
from these lawyers pro bono.167 Countering this support for the provi-
sion of more pro bono services by lawyers is the consistent opposition by
many practicing lawyers to requiring or otherwise pressuring them to
provide pro bono legal services to the poor or any other group or cause,
or to requiring or urging them to provide any set number of hours that
they should devote each year to providing pro bono legal services. Dif-
ferent reasons exist for this opposition but a principal reason, publicly
declared or not, undoubtedly is self-interest. The lawyers are opposed
because it would be too costly to them in time or in money, or in other
respects would be contrary to their perceived self-interests.168 As one
observer has remarked: "A system that depends on private lawyers is
ultimately dependent on their interests." 69
quired practice areas. (Among more specific discouraging factors listed were a
commitment to family obligations, discouragement from the employer, lack of
administrative support or resources, lack of malpractice insurance and lack of
desire). Id. at 18.
Attorneys surveyed, on average, said they provided an additional 38 hours of free
pro bono services to individuals or groups seeking to secure or protect civil
rights, to community organizations and other non-profits and to efforts to im-
prove the legal system. Id. at 5.
Of those respondents who indicated doing free pro bono work for poor people or organizations
that address the needs of the poor, the percentages of work they conducted in particular areas
were: family (34%), business/corporate (31%), consumer (26%), estates/probate (22%), elder
(19%), housinglevictions (19%), civil rights (16%), public benefits (12%). Id. at 10. On how
large law firm pro bono programs might improve, see Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L.
Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357 (2010).
The Cummings & Rhode article includes empirical data on large law firm pro bono programs
obtained from interviews with pro bono counsel from thirty law firms in different regions of
the United States. A pro bono counsel is a person in a large firm responsible for overseeing
the design, coordination, and evaluation of a law firm's pro bono program. Id. at 2360.
Paralegals also provide poor persons some pro bono legal services. See, e.g., Lori
Thompson, The CASA Movement: How Paralegals Can Use Their Skills to Advocate for Chil-
dren, 24 LEGAL ASSISTANT TODAY 81 (July/Aug. 2007) (discussing a program that allows
paralegals to be involved in child-abuse court cases and passing child-protection legislation).
167 Among organizations supporting such enhanced efforts, including efforts to energize
and strengthen pro bono initiatives at the state and local level, is the ABA. See ABA SUPPORT-
ING JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 21-22.
168 Self-interest related factors were among those that lawyers participating in a recent pro
bono study stated as factors discouraging them from performing pro bono work. Id. at 18. It
is quite possible that these discouraging factors were actually even greater deterrents to many
of the lawyers than they indicated, as being asked to publicly declare their motivation might
have caused some to downplay the importance of the self-interest factors. Id.
169 Cummings, supra note 4, at 147. Cummings also notes this weakness in the current
pro bono system: "Pro bono lawyers do not invest heavily in gaining substantive expertise,
getting to know the broader public interest field, or understanding the long-range goals of
client groups." Id. at 148.
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A. Should Pro Bono Legal Services for the Poor Be Mandatory for
All Licensed Lawyers?
This has long been a very controversial issue but mandatory pro
bono for all licensed lawyers has lacked sufficient support, especially
from lawyers and law firms, for it to become an obligatory legal require-
ment. The principal pro-mandatory pro bono arguments are that there
continues to be a very serious shortage of adequate legal services for the
poor that mandatory pro bono would be more effective in reducing than
voluntary pro bono has been, 170 mandatory pro bono by lawyers is a
reasonable quid pro quo for lawyers' legal monopoly over the practice of
law,17 ' and a mandatory pro bono requirement for lawyers would im-
prove the popular image of lawyers. 17 2
Many arguments can be advanced against mandatory pro bono.
One such argument is that mandatory pro bono is a very inefficient way
of increasing legal services for the poor. It would force many lawyers to
forego some higher hourly rate work that much lower-paid lawyers-if
added to legal aid or public defender agencies-could perform if the
funds were available to employ more of these lower paid lawyers. Ad-
ding to the alleged inefficiency of mandatory pro bono is that many prac-
ticing lawyers lack familiarity with the legal problems of the poor, and if
these lawyers take on such representation, they must spend additional
170 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY 277-82 (1988) (pro-
posing a plan for mandatory pro bono); RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE, supra
note 165, at 171-72 (2005) ("[Mlandating some market [pro bono] contribution of services or
support from practicing lawyers seems justifiable in principle ... a modest obligation of time
or money would be worth trying."); Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1113, 1126 (1991); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong
Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78, 87-88 (1990).
171 Lardent, supra note 170, at 87; Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil
Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 74-75 (1990); Deborah L.
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 2415, 2419 (1999).
172 Steven Wechsler, Attorneys' Attitudes Toward Mandatory Pro Bono, 41 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 909, 925 (1990).
On other arguments that have been advanced in support of mandatory pro bono, see
Lardent, supra note 172, at 86-88; Reed E. Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory
Pro Bono and Moral Development, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 462-66, 505-07 (2001).
One such argument is that if a mandatory pro bono program is properly structured it can
contribute to the moral development of lawyers. Id. at 505; see also Lawrence J. Fox, Should
We Mandate Doing Well by Doing Good?, in RAISE THE BAR 251 (Lawrence J. Fox ed., 2007)
(explaining why the author, a large law firm partner, is a proponent of mandatory pro bono);
Fiona McLeay, The Legal Profession's Beautiful Myth: Surveying the Justifications for the
Lawyer's Obligation to Provide Pro Bono Work, 15 INTL. J. OF THE LEGAL PROF. 249, 251
(2008) (analyzing what the author, an Australian lawyer and pro bono coordinator at a large
Australian law firm, considers to be the main arguments that have been advanced for
mandatory pro bono, and concluding that all of these arguments are of questionable validity
but that they have been very helpful motivating inducements for many lawyers to provide
much needed pro bono work).
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time acquiring the background knowledge needed to provide competent
representation of the poor.'7 3 It would be more efficient, some argue, not
to mandate pro bono services by all practicing lawyers but to impose an
annual fee on those practicing lawyers who elect not to provide pro bono
services during the year-the funds thereby obtained would then be used
to increase the number of full-time legal aid lawyers.174 Opponents of
mandatory pro bono have also argued that mandatory pro bono is ineffi-
cient and wasteful because legal services are of low priority in the list of
what most poor people with legal problems consider their unfilled
needs.175 It would be preferable, this opponent argues, if funds made
available for the poor by lawyers were distributed to poor persons to be
used for whatever needs each distributee considers preferable.176 An-
other argument against mandatory pro bono is that it would impose a
severe financial burden on many solo and small firm lawyers who, de-
spite working long hours, are earning a net return at or below an accept-
able middle class standard of living.' 77 Still another anti-mandatory pro
bono argument is that it would be unconstitutional-a violation of the
First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Consti-
tution-although due to lack of adoptions of mandatory pro bono there is
no case law authority clearly so holding. 78 Some less convincing argu-
ments against mandatory pro bono are that it is wasteful because some
unworthy clients will receive pro bono legal representation, it is unfairly
selective because only lawyers and no other professionals are required to
173 See Cramton, supra note 170, at 1127; see also Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross,
What's Not To Like About Being a Lawyer, 109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1484-85 (2000).
174 See Cramton, supra note 170, at 1128-29; Lardent, supra note 170, at 85.
175 See Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for
the Rich, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1116 (1992); see also Silver & Cross, supra note 175, at
1482-83.
176 See Macey, supra note 175, at 1116-18.
177 See Cramton, supra note 170, at 1128; Cummings & Rhode, supra note 166, at 2365;
Lardent, supra note 170, at 99-100; Macey, supra note 175, at 1120.
178 For analysis of these constitutional arguments see RHODE, PRO BoNo IN PRINCIPLE
AND PRACTICE, supra note 165, at 10; Cramton, supra note 170, at 1131-32; David L. Shapiro,
The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735, 762-77 (1980); see also
John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the Constitution, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1229, 1244-61 (1991) (analyzing the constitutionality of recommendations in the Marrero
Committee Report). The Marrero Committee was appointed by the Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, and recommended mandatory pro bono for New York lawyers. Scully
was counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation, a politically conservative organization. Id.
Of some relevance to the constitutionality of mandatory pro bono for lawyers, is case law
suggesting that court appointment of an attorney to represent an indigent person without com-
pensation, a requirement very analogous to mandatory pro bono, is unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
State ex rel Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 842 (Kan. 1987) (holding that mandatory pro
bono violates the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution); Scott v. Roper,
688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) (holding that court appointments without compensation in
civil cases violate the Missouri constitution).
ADEQUATE LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR
serve the poor, and it is ethically suspect if it permits a buy-out option for
lawyers subject to the mandatory service requirement.17 9
An important sub-issue in the debate over legally mandated pro
bono is what activities of lawyers should satisfy the pro bono require-
ment. In addition to legal services for the poor, should legal services
without a fee suffice if the services are provided to any public service
type organization or to any efforts to improve the law, the legal system,
or the legal profession. If other kinds of worthy legal services or efforts
will fulfill the mandatory pro bono requirement, it is quite conceivable
that mandatory pro bono would add no additional, or perhaps even fewer,
legal services for the poor than what currently is being provided by law-
yers' voluntary pro bono legal services for the poor. This is possible
because if uncompensated services other than legal services for the poor
could fulfill the mandatory pro bono requirement, most lawyers might
decide to provide these other kinds of uncompensated services. 1s0
Proposal
Mandatory pro bono legal services for the poor should be required,
with some exceptions, of all lawyers licensed to practice law in any U.S.
jurisdiction. However, any lawyer subject to the requirement should
have the option to buy-out of the requirement by paying an annual fee to
an organization that provides legal services to the poor pro bono. The
fee should be the equivalent of the average two-week salary of full-time
legal aid lawyers engaged in the provision of legal services for the poor
in the state where the licensed lawyer maintains his or her principal of-
fice. The law of each state should set forth rules clarifying which legal
service providers for the poor lawyers and law firms should pay or allo-
cate their fees. But the fees should be allocated only for the provision of
legal services for the poor. Law firms should be permitted to delegate
the pro bono service obligation of one or more designated lawyers in the
firm to one or more other lawyers in the firm. Exempted from the
mandatory pro bono requirement should be licensed lawyers over sixty-
five years of age, who no longer are employed or practicing law full-
time, and full-time judges.
The shortage of adequate legal services for the poor by lawyers is so
great and the adverse consequences of that shortage are so extensive and
harmful that every licensed lawyer, with some exceptions, should be re-
179 These arguments are considered, along with other arguments, in a book-length analy-
sis by Ronald Silverman on the 1990 Marrero Committee report. Ronald H. Silverman, Con-
ceiving a Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 885, 956-58 (1991). On the
Marrero Committee Report, see also Scully, supra note 178.
180 See Cramton, supra note 170, at 1129; Lardent, supra note 170, at 100; Luban, supra
note 170, at 278-79.
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quired not just as a professional obligation or moral obligation, but also
as a legal obligation, to provide to the poor appreciable needed legal
services or the financial equivalent of such services.
B. Should Efforts be Made to Increase the Volume and Quality of
Lawyers' Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Services for the Poor?
Although mandatory pro bono has failed to be adopted there is ex-
tensive support for increasing the number of lawyers who voluntarily
provide pro bono legal services for poor people at no fee and for increas-
ing the total volume and quality of such voluntary services by lawyers.
But how this should be done raises issues as to what action should be
taken and by whom. Further, most proposals for action have encoun-
tered substantial resistance from many practicing lawyers.' 81 One such
issue is whether the rules of professional conduct adopted by the courts
include one or more rules setting forth the nonmandatory professional
responsibility of lawyers to provide pro bono legal services for the poor
who are in need of legal services. In an attempt to resolve this issue, the
ABA adopted Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a
rule that has been adopted as a court rule in most all states, although in
some states it has been adopted with modifications.18 2 Rule 6.1 declares
that every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal ser-
vices to those unable to pay, but this responsibility is only aspirational
not legally binding. It then states that "[a] lawyer should aspire to render
at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year," and in
fulfilling this responsibility should provide legal services at no fee or a
substantially reduced fee to any of a wide variety of recipients, including
persons of limited means, or should participate in activities for improv-
ing the law, the legal system, or the legal profession.183 Rule 6.1 does,
181 On these issues and emphasizing that law firm pro bono programs too often stress
quantity over quality and easy wins over social impact, see Deborah Rhode, Pro Bono! For
Whose Good?, AM. LAW., July 2009, at 56.
182 For a recent state-by-state listing of each state's pro bono professional responsibility
rule, including whether each state had adopted the then current version of ABA Rule 6.1, an
earlier version of ABA Rule 6.1, or some other pro bono rule, see State-By-State Pro Bono
Service Rules, AM. BAR Ass'N, available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/
stateethicsrules.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
183 The comment to ABA Model Rule 6.1 says that "States, however, may decide to
choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual pro bono service." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1. The New York version of Rule 6.1 includes the following: "Every
lawyer should aspire to: (1) provide at least 20 hours of pro bono each year to poor persons;
and (2) contribute financially to organizations that provide legal services to poor persons."
N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 1200.45(d) (2010) (emphasis added).
Arizona Rule 6.1(c) permits the pro bono work of some lawyers to be allocated to other
lawyers. Arizona Rule 6.1(c) provides that:
A law firm or other group of lawyers may satisfy their responsibility under this
Rule, if they desire, collectively. For example, the designation of one or more law-
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however, state that a substantial majority of the fifty hours of pro bono
legal services without fee or expectation of fee should be legal services
provided to persons of limited means or for legal services provided to
certain kinds of organizations "in matters designed primarily to address
the needs of persons of limited means." A comment to Rule 6.1 adds
that: "The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be en-
forced through disciplinary process." 1 8 4
Current ABA Model Rule 6.1 obviously is a compromise solution to
the legal and policy issues of whether or not the rules of professional
conduct should include a voluntary pro bono rule and, if such a rule is
included, what it should provide. A few states have refused to adopt the
current version of ABA Model Rule 6.1, but have adopted and retained a
less detailed and somewhat less demanding pro bono rule.18 5 In an ap-
parent effort to remind lawyers of their pro bono responsibilities and also
to induce more lawyers to increase the volume of their pro bono services,
a minority of states have added to Rule 6.1, or some other court rule, a
requirement that each lawyer annually report to a state agency or to the
state bar association the extent of the lawyer's pro bono activities in the
previous year.'8 6 A few states also have added a buy-out provision to the
Rule 6.1 pro bono aspirational responsibility of each lawyer.187
Another type of voluntary pro bono legal requirement, one that has
been adopted by a small minority of states, is to create a voluntary pro
bono program in each locality within the state, each program adminis-
yers to work on pro bono publico matters may be attributed to other lawyers within
the firm or group who support the representation. Other forms of collective activity,
if approved by the State Bar, may also satisfy the responsibility.
ARIz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 6.1.
184 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. [12]. The New York version of Rule
6.1 includes the ABA comment on the rule and adds: "[F]ailure to fulfill the aspirational goals
contained herein should be without legal consequences." N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
§ 1200.45(d) (2010).
185 See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2008); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2008).
186 See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 756(f); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 6.1(b)(1)
(2010); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1(b) (2010). The Washington Rule further
states that lawyers providing a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono service also shall receive a
commendation from the Washington State Bar Association. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 6.1 (2010).
187 See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF. CONDUcT R. 4-6.1(b) (2010). Florida's rule states that
to fulfill the lawyer's aspirational responsibility, each lawyer should provide twenty hours of
pro bono legal services to the poor, or in lieu thereof, make an annual contribution of $350 to a
legal aid organization. Id.; see also MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2010) (stating
that a lawyer should provide annually twenty-five hours of pro bono legal services to persons
of limited means or to "charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental, and educational
organizations in matters that are designated primarily to address the needs of persons of lim-
ited means" or "contribute from $250 to 1% of the lawyer's annual taxable, professional in-
come to one or more organizations that provide or support legal services to persons of limited
means").
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tered by a local committee, most of whom are local lawyers. Among the
legally declared objectives of some such programs is not only to increase
the volume of voluntary pro bono legal services in each locality, but also
to better evaluate the locality's needs for pro bono legal services.' 88 A
few states, by court rule, have also sought to increase the volume of
lawyer voluntary pro bono by granting a lawyer an exemption from the
state's annual continuing legal education requirement proportionate to
the hours during the year that the lawyer provided pro bono legal ser-
vices to poor people. 89
Bar associations also have made efforts to increase the volume and
the quality of pro bono legal services by lawyers. The ABA, for exam-
ple, operates a Litigation Assistance Partnership Program to match sig-
nificant pro bono cases with law firms willing and well-qualified to
provide the needed pro bono legal services, has issued a Pro Bono and
Public Service Best Practices Resource Guide, and, for many years, oper-
ated a Child Custody and Adoption Pro Bono Project that enhanced pro
bono legal services for children in custody cases that are in need of legal
services.190 Some state and local bar associations also have sought to
increase the volume and quality of lawyer voluntary pro bono legal ser-
vices by providing training programs for lawyers who have volunteered
to provide pro bono legal services for the poor and by providing malprac-
tice insurance for some of these lawyers. 191
Proposal
Efforts to increase voluntary pro bono legal services for the poor by
lawyers in each U.S. jurisdiction should continue and be accelerated as a
compromise measure until the jurisdiction has adopted a satisfactory
mandatory pro bono legal services for the poor requirement that is the
same or substantially the same as the mandatory pro bono for lawyers
proposal made above in this Article. Among efforts to increase volun-
tary pro bono legal services for the poor that merit increased support are
188 See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.6-1(a), (c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(E) (2010); see
also IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.6(a) (2010).
189 See, e.g., TENN. SuP. CT. R. 21, § 4.07(c); WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 104
(2009).
190 For brief descriptions of these ABA activities, see Joanne Martin & Stephen Daniels,
Pro Bono: More than a Professional Responsibility, in RAISE THE BAR 232-33 (Lawrence J.
Fox ed., 2007); Michael A. Mogil, Professing Pro Bono: To Walk the Talk, 15 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 5, 16 (2001); ABA CoMM. ON PRO BoNo AND PUBLIC SERVICE &
ABA FAM. L. SEC., ENHANCING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN PRIVATE CUSTODY
CASES: RESOURCES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ABA CHILD CUSTODY AND ADOPTION
PRO BoNo PROJECT 2001-2008, 7-8 (2008). Most ABA actions concerning lawyer pro bono
legal services are supported by the ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Services
and the ABA Center for Pro Bono.
191 See RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE, supra note 165, at 173-77.
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adoption of ABA Model Rule 6.1, without any significant modifications,
in every U.S. jurisdiction, and more in-person or online information and
training services on representation of clients pro bono made available by
bar associations to lawyer pro bono volunteers.
IV. ISSUES CONCERNING PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES OR OTHER
BENEFITS FOR THE POOR BY LAW SCHOOLS, THEIR
STUDENTS, AND THEIR FACULTY MEMBERS
Some students and faculty members in most U.S. law schools are
involved in providing legal or other legal services in furtherance of what
the law school or the legal service providers consider worthy objectives,
and legal service courses and law student pro bono programs are the
principal means of their doing So. 19 2 One of the major objectives of
many legal service courses and many law student pro bono programs is
providing legal services or other legal benefits to poor persons. Many
law schools also have one or more separate organizations referred to as
legal clinics, with a separate staff, including full-time faculty members,
some of whom may be tenured and classified as clinical professors. 193
192 In this Article the term "legal service course" is a course offered by a law school in
which students provide or assist in the provision of legal services pro bono under the supervi-
sion or guidance of one or more law school faculty members or outside lawyers and for which
course credit is granted if the student's legal services and any other course assignments are
satisfactorily fulfilled. Legal service courses provide law students opportunities to represent
clients, assist others in representing a client, or as the opportunity to lecture groups of persons
as to their legal rights or duties, educating school children on some laws or legal institutions,
and lobbying members of law making bodies to adopt or reject certain proposed laws. A legal
service course also may, and often does, include class sessions for which background reading
assignments are made and at which discussions occur on the law and policy issues relevant to
the kinds of legal services that the students in the course have been or will be providing. In
their course descriptions of legal service courses some law schools use the term legal clinic,
legal clinic seminar, workshop, or student laboratory to designate what this Article designates
as a legal service course.
In this Article the term "law student pro bono program" is a project of a law school or a
student organization in a law school in which students provide legal or other services pro bono
in furtherance of law or policy objectives that the law school or the law student organization
considers to be highly desirable. Advice or guidance, if any, of students actively involved in
providing law student pro bono program services is provided by law school faculty members,
staff members of outside organizations, or other law students, usually more experienced law
students. Most all law schools will not grant course credit for student participation in a law
school pro bono program. In a few law schools, however, course credit may be granted for
some student program activities.
193 On the objectives of law school legal clinics, and also the objectives of many legal
service courses, see Ass'N OF AM. L. ScH., COMMIsSIoN ON PRO BoNo AND PULIC SERVICES
OPPORTUNITIES, REPORT 3 (1999), available at www.aals.org/probono/report.html; Peter T.
Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 93 (1994); Edmund
Kitch, Foreword, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE, U. CHI.
LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE SERIES No. 20, at 13-20 (Edmund Kitch ed., 1965); Twelfth An-
nual Liman Public Interest Colloquium, YALE LAW SCHOOL, available at www.law.yale.edul
intellectuallife/8288.htm [hereinafter YALE SyMposIUM] (last visited Feb. 25, 2010); Stephen
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The principal function of many legal clinic staff members is teaching
legal service courses, including supervision or guidance of students in
the students' provision of legal services. Clinical staff members them-
selves provide some of the legal services required in many of the liti-
gated cases in which students are also providing some of the legal
services. Other functions commonly performed by clinical staff mem-
bers are developing and administering law student pro bono programs,
providing advice or guidance to students in law student pro bono pro-
grams, and writing articles for scholarly publications.
The number of legal service courses offered by many law schools
has increased since the 1960s, as funding for legal clinics and legal ser-
vice courses has increased and as support for these courses as helpful
means of student legal education has increased. 194 Some law schools in
recent academic years have been offering a dozen or more different legal
service courses in each academic year, some of these courses offered in
Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing
Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (2004); Panel on Law Schools' Commitments to
Clinical Education: Structure, Stature, and Subsidies, YALE SYMPosIUM, supra note 193; see
also Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) (considering, in
considerable detail, how law schools could most effectively prepare students for practice with
a separate chapter on Best Practices for Experiential Courses and separate consideration of
simulation-based courses and legal service courses.); Ass'n of Am. L. Sch., Report of the
Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic; Report of the Subcommittee on Pedagogical
Goals of In-House, Live-Client Clinics, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511 (1992) (setting forth the fol-
lowing goals of law school clinics: developing modes of planning and analysis for dealing with
in structural situations; providing professional skills instruction; teaching means of learning
from experience; instructing students in professional responsibility; exposing students to the
demands and methods of acting in role; providing opportunities for collaborative learning;
imparting the obligation of service to indigent clients, information about how to engage in
such representation, and knowledge concerning the impact of the legal system on poor people;
providing the opportunity for examining the impact of legal doctrine on real life; and providing
a laboratory in which students and faculty members study particular areas of the law; and
critique the capacities and limitations of lawyers and the legal system).
194 For a history of legal clinics and legal service courses in the United States, see Wil-
liam P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A
View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REv. 463, 465-71 (1975); Suzanne Valdez Carey, An
Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal Education and Its Impact on Student Trial Practice,
51 U. KAN. L. REv. 509, 513-16 (2003); Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal
Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1929, 1930-34 (2002). See also
Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. L.
REv. 1099 (1997). Robert MacCrate was chairman of an ABA Task Force that issued an
influential report on proposed improvements in legal education, often referred to as the Mac-
Crate report. See ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDuc. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY, THE ROLE OF THE LAW
SCHOOLs (1979).
For a very comprehensive bibliography of books and articles concerning law school legal
clinics and their legal service activities, see J.P. Ogilvy & Karen Czapanskiy, Clinical Legal
Education: An Annotated Bibliography, 11 CLINICAL L. REv. I (Special Issue 2) (2005). For a
recent overview of law school clinics at Yale Law School and elsewhere, see YALE SYMPo-
slum, supra note 193.
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both the fall and spring semesters.19 5 But a deterrent to many law
schools increasing the number of legal service courses has been and will
continue to be the financial cost of most such courses. Legal service
courses at many law schools are expensive, each more expensive in dol-
lar cost than the average cost of their other law school courses. This is
because the average student enrollment in most legal service courses at
many law schools is much lower than the average student enrollment in
other courses.196 The lower student enrollment in most legal service
courses is essential to enable proper faculty supervision and guidance of
students in most such courses. Enrollment limits for some legal service
courses at some law schools are increased by, in each such course, as-
signing more than one faculty member to providing supervision and gui-
dance to students in the students' provision of legal services. But this
can increase the financial cost of these courses by the added cost to the
law school of multiple instructors in each such course.
The principal objectives of most law school legal service courses
are furthering social justice, as by providing legal services to the poor in
need of such services; increasing student skills needed in the practice of
law, and instilling and intensifying in students the professional and moral
norms that they should adhere to as lawyers. Law school legal service
courses commonly seek to increase student skills in one or more of the
following: drafting legal instruments, counseling clients, interviewing
clients and witnesses, engaging in courtroom trial or appellate advocacy,
and providing informative and persuasive oral presentations to courts or
to interest groups. In some of these courses an important means of in-
creasing student litigation skills is for students to make court appearances
on behalf of clients, appearances that are authorized by court rule in
many states.19 7
Law student pro bono programs have become increasingly prevalent
over time in many law schools and most law schools now have one or
more such programs, some law schools many more. 198 These programs
195 See, for example, the recent course listings of Cornell Law School, New York Univer-
sity Law School, and Yale Law School. Cornell Law School, despite being located a great
distance from any big city, is offering nineteen legal service courses in academic year
2010-11. See Spring 2011 Course Offerings and Descriptions, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, avail-
able at https://support.law.cornell.edulstudents/forms/RegistrarCourse-Descriptions.pdf.
196 On the greater cost of legal service courses due to their smaller numbers of students
than most traditional law school courses, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Remarks at the Panel on
Law Schools' Commitment to Clinical Education: Structure, Status, and Subsidies, in YALE
SYMPosIUM, supra note 193.
197 For court rules authorizing law students to make court appearances on behalf of cli-
ents, see, for example, CAL. R. CT. 9.42 (2007); CONN. SUP. CT. R. 3.14-3.21 (2010); and FLA.
CT. R. 11-2.
198 A listing and brief description of these programs in many law schools appears in ABA
STANDING CoMMITTEE ON PRO BONO & PUBLIC SERVICE AND CENTER FOR PRO BONo, DIREc-
TORY OF LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRO BONO PROGRAMS, LAW SCHOOL PRO BONO
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are indicative of the desire of many law students to engage in a wider
range of pro bono activities or to benefit a wider range of persons or
causes than what their law school provides in its legal service courses. It
also is indicative of a desire by many law students to, on their own, with
little or no supervision by law faculty members, other faculty staff, or
persons from outside the law school, initiate and implement pro bono
projects that the students consider highly desirable. Law student pro
bono programs presumably are viewed very favorably by some law
school administrations and more such programs encouraged by the ad-
ministrations because the added programs could avoid the financial cost
of adding more legal service courses at their school, courses far more
financially costly to their school than most law student pro bono
programs.
A. Should Every Law School Legal Service Course Concentrate on
Providing Legal Services to the Poor or for the Benefit of the
Poor?
As the potential of law school legal service courses to be a very
helpful and expanded form of legal education has become more widely
recognized, many law schools have added legal service courses that con-
centrate on providing legal services in furtherance of causes that the law
schools consider merit support but that have little or nothing to do with
benefiting the poor.199 But given the tremendous shortage of adequate
PROGRAMS-STUDENT RUN PRO BONO GROUPS AND SPECIALIZED LAw EDUCATION PROGRAMS
(2008), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools [hereinafter ABA PRO BoNo
DIRECTORY]. The Arizona State College of Law, Columbia University School of Law, and
New York University School of Law each have an unusually large number of such programs.
Id. Among the Arizona State University programs are the Advocacy Program for Battered
Women, in which students assist attorneys in providing legal information and referrals to do-
mestic violence victims at eight women's hospitals; the Eloy INS Detention Center Project, in
which students teach immigrants detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service how
they can represent themselves in immigration court; and the Student Animal Legal Defense
Organization, in which students assist attorneys with research, litigation and lobbying to help
companion, wildlife, and laboratory animals. Id. at 3-4. Among the Columbia University
School of Law programs are the Civilian Oversight of the Police Project, in which a lawyer-
supervised group of students advocate on behalf of complainants who have reported police
misconduct to the Civilian Complaint Review Board; the Rights Link project, in which stu-
dents provide legal documents and research to various organizations throughout the world; and
the U.S. Attorney's Office Project, in which students assist federal prosecutors in Manhattan
by such means as researching and drafting trial and appellate briefs. Id. Among the New
York University School of Law programs are those of the law school's High School Law
Institute, that among other activities, offers courses in constitutional law and criminal law and
procedure to 10th and 11th grade students at some New York City public high schools; pro-
grams of the law school's Prisoner's Rights Education Project, a student organization that
teaches legal research skills to inmates of New York state prisons; and programs of the NYU
Youth and Criminal Justice Society that hosts lunch speakers and performs services to further
youth and criminal justice. Id.
199 For a definition of "legal service course," see supra note 192.
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legal services for the poor and the need for more laws that are beneficial
to the poor, should law schools be permitted to offer legal service
courses in which the services provided are not to or for the benefit of
poor people or large groups of people most of whom are poor? The
proposal below is a response to this law and policy issue.
Proposal
Law school legal service courses that concentrate on providing legal
services to achieving objectives that have little or nothing to do with
legal service needs or legal benefits for the poor should be permitted,
even encouraged. But to assure that the legal service courses in each law
school are providing an acceptable share of legal services to or for the
benefit of the poor, a majority of legal service courses in each law school
should be courses that concentrate predominantly on providing legal ser-
vices to or for the benefit of the poor or large groups of people, most of
whom are poor. This concentration requirement should be imposed by
the law of each state and also as a condition to law school accreditation.
B. Should Law School Faculty Members Be More Frequently and
Extensively Involved in Efforts to Benefit Poor People by Being
Actively Involved in the Litigation of One or More Major Cases
Concerning the Interests of the Poor, Providing Their Services
Pro Bono?
A major case concerning the poor is one that seems likely to result
in a final judicial decision that establishes, expands, sustains, or reduces
highly important legal rights or benefits of many poor people. Usually
each such case is bitterly contested, involves a very controversial law or
policy issue, generates considerable interest and often apprehension in
partisan interest groups nationally or in a particular state, and is ulti-
mately decided by an appellate court.2 0 0
200 Examples of major litigated cases concerning interests of the poor that are cited, or
cited and discussed elsewhere in this Article are Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
see supra note 8 and accompanying text; Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998),
see supra notes 118-126 and accompanying text; In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 588 So. 2d
448 (Fla. 1989), see supra note 158 and accompanying text; and State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith,
747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987), see supra note 178 and accompanying text.
Cases focusing on very controversial constitutional issues concerning interests of the
poor, particularly very controversial issues as to the scope or meaning of relevant U.S. consti-
tutional concepts, are likely to become future major litigated cases concerning interests of the
poor. Examples of possible future such constitutional cases are these: a case as to whether or
not poor people have a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases similar to what the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright they had in criminal cases, see supra note 8; for
cases as to whether or not IOLTA programs violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, see supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text; for cases as to whether or not mandatory
pro bono for lawyers, if adopted, would violate the U.S. Constitution, see supra note 178 and
accompanying text; a case or cases as to whether or not each of the statutory restrictions on
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Many more major litigated cases concerning the poor should be
brought by proponents of increased legal rights and benefits for the poor
and who will continue their involvement in the case until it is finally
decided. In each such case the pro-interest of the poor proponent should
be represented by one or more lawyers committed to furthering the inter-
ests of the poor and with the ability, available time, and the needed staff
support personnel to assure that at every stage in the litigation proceed-
ings, including the likely appeal to a state supreme court or the U.S.
Supreme Court, sufficient efforts are being made to achieve the objective
of a final decision favorable to the poor.
More efforts should also be made to provide reliable research data
on the variety of possible litigation opportunities concerning the poor and
also on identifying which of these possible cases appear to have suffi-
cient prospect of a final decision favorable to the poor that proponents of
increased legal rights and benefits for the poor will seriously consider
bringing. But even if a particular major litigated case concerning the
poor currently appears to have a reasonable prospect of a final decision
favorable to the poor, the high prospective financial cost to the proponent
of representation by a private law firm in a major litigated case concern-
ing the poor prevents many proponents of increased legal rights and ben-
efits for the poor from bringing such a case. This high prospective
financial cost of a private law firm is due principally to the extensive
time that the firm's lawyers and support staff personnel in all probability
must spend in fully and properly representing the proponent at each stage
of the proceeding, including likely appeal to one or more appellate
courts, before the case is finally decided, law firm personnel time that the
client must pay for.
The high financial cost to the proponent of representation by a pri-
vate law firm in a major litigated case concerning the poor occasionally
can be avoided by a legal aid, public defender, or other nonprofit organi-
zation whose activities are concentrated on providing legal services pro
bono to many poor people, providing, at the request of the proponent, all
the legal services needed to fully and properly represent the proponent
who brings a major litigated case. But seldom will any such organization
agree to do so, or as an alternative become the proponent as well as legal
service provider in furthering the interests of the poor in a major litigated
case concerning the poor. The reason that these organizations generally
avoid extensive involvement in providing legal services in such a case is
recipients of Legal Service Corporation funding is constitutional, see supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text. An example of a possible future non-constitutional major litigated case
concerning interests of the poor is a case as to whether or not judges should be prohibited from
providing any assistance to pro se parties because judges providing any such assistance vio-
lates judges' obligation of impartiality and fairness. See infra note 225 and accompanying
text.
ADEQUATE LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR
that the involvement would require such extensive allocation of their
lawyers and other personnel as to require a very substantial reduction in
the number of poor people in need of legal services to whom they will
provide representation or other legal assistance. It is also very unlikely
that any private law firm lawyer who occasionally provides pro bono
legal services to poor persons will agree to provide pro bono all or a
substantial portion of the legal services needed in representing a propo-
nent of increased legal rights and benefits for the poor if the proponent
brings a major litigated case concerning the poor. Such an agreement is
unlikely because the representation would probably necessitate the law-
yer, for many months, greatly reducing the legal services that he or she
provides to fee-paying clients.
There obviously has been, and continues to be, a shortage of both
proponents of increased legal rights and benefits for the poor who will
bring such cases and legal service providers who will fully and compe-
tently provide the legal services, including staff support services, needed
in representing these proponents on terms the proponents will accept.
There is, however, a potential source both of more such proponents and
more such legal and staff support service providers. This source also
could be very helpful in providing legal and staff support services pro
bono to some defendants in major litigated cases concerning the poor
who are opposing plaintiffs' efforts to eliminate or erode some legal
rights or benefits of the poor. The source is U.S. law school faculty
members who favor increased legal rights and benefits for the poor,
probably a majority of faculty members at most every U.S. law school.
Each of these faculty members is capable of competently providing or
competently assisting others in providing at least some of the legal ser-
vices needed in litigating a major case concerning the poor. Even law
school faculty members who never graduated from a law school or never
were students at a law school have the capability of assisting in providing
at least some of the staff support services needed in litigating a major
case concerning the poor and are legally authorized to do so. Extensive
and protracted faculty member participation in a particular major case
concerning the poor is more likely to occur, and if it does occur, more
likely to be most effectively and competently performed if multiple
faculty members at one or more law schools collaborate and share the
service providing obligations.
There are, of course, potential costs to a faculty member who be-
comes extensively involved in the litigation of a major case concerning
the poor, especially if the faculty member's services are provided pro
bono as they often would be. There also are potential costs to the law
school employing the faculty member if the faculty member becomes
extensively involved in the litigation of a major case concerning the
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poor. But as to both faculty member and law school employing the
faculty member the advantages generally outweigh the disadvantages of
extensive faculty member involvement in a major case concerning the
poor if the objective of the faculty member's involvement in providing
the services is furthering the interests of the poor.201
Proposal
Many more U.S. law school faculty members who favor increased
legal rights and benefits for the poor should be involved in representing
or assisting others in representing parties in major cases concerning the
poor whose objective as parties is obtaining a final decision in a case that
is favorable to the interests of the poor. Also, services provided by such
faculty members in representing or assisting others in representing such
parties in a major case concerning the poor should be offered and pro-
vided pro bono if this would substantially increase the likelihood that a
proponent of the interests of the poor would bring such a case or substan-
tially increase the likelihood that such a party, whether plaintiff or defen-
dant, would be willing or able to fund or acquire the funding from others
to facilitate the case to be adequately litigate. More law school faculty
members also should be involved in persuading individuals or organiza-
tions who favor increased legal rights or benefits for the poor, including
other law school faculty members, to bring, or join with them in bring-
ing, a major litigated case concerning the poor with the objective of ob-
taining a final judicial decision increasing the legal rights or benefits of
the poor.
The above is a policy proposal not a legal proposal, and its imple-
mentation does not require extensive, new, or revised laws. There are,
however, some changes in the law that could and should be made. If
made, these changes would help somewhat in implementing the above
proposals. Examples of such changes are adoption in some or all states
of a mandatory pro bono by lawyers court rule,202 increased funding by
the state legislatures of each and every state university law school in their
state,203 and adoption of laws that would enable lawyers licensed to prac-
201 For further consideration of costs and benefits of law faculty members becoming in-
volved in providing legal services in litigated cases concerning the poor see infra Part IV.C.
That consideration of costs and benefits is focused on faculty member services provided pro
bono would also be relevant to most any faculty member services in furthering interests of the
poor in any major litigated case, even if the faculty member's services were not being provided
pro bono.
202 On the benefits of such a mandatory pro bono requirement and a proposal on
mandatory pro bono, see supra Part UI.A.
203 This could result in more state law school faculty members' teaching obligations being
reduced with the consequences that more faculty members favorable to increased legal rights
and benefits for the poor would become involved in a major litigated case concerning the poor
with the objective of helping achieve a final decision favorable to the poor.
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tice law in another state but not in the state where a particular case is
pending to more quickly and more assuredly become legally authorized
to represent a party in the particular case. 204
There is a great variety of helpful and merited actions that could be
taken by law schools and proponents of increased legal rights and reme-
dies for the poor to increase prospects of the proposal just above being
implemented or more extensively and effectively implemented. Among
such actions are: advocating changes in the law that could be helpful in
implementing the above proposals; much more extensive publicizing of
the potential of possible future major cases of benefit to the poor and the
potential of some possible future major cases of harm to the poor; much
more extensive publicizing of the potential of law school faculty mem-
bers who favor increased legal rights and benefits for the poor to make a
contribution, often a very substantial contribution, to furthering or
preventing the deletion of major legal rights or benefits of the poor by
becoming actively involved in representing or assisting others in repre-
senting parties in major cases concerning the poor when the objective of
the parties being represented is achieving a final judicial decision benefi-
cial to the poor; more law schools facilitating and encouraging their
faculty members who favor increased legal rights and benefits for the
poor to become involved or more extensively involved in representing or
assisting others in representing parties in major cases concerning the
poor when the objective of the parties being represented is achieving a
final decision beneficial to the poor; more faculty members who favor
increased legal rights and benefits for the poor attempting to persuade
additional faculty members to join them in representing parties in a ma-
jor litigated case concerning the poor, or assisting others who are repre-
senting such parties, when the objective of the parties being represented
is achieving a final decision favorable to the poor; and more faculty
members who favor increased legal rights and benefits for the poor at-
tempting to persuade additional faculty members to join them in bringing
a major litigated case concerning the poor the objective of which will be
a final decision increasing the legal rights or benefits of the poor.
204 Such laws would enable more U.S. faculty members who favor increased legal rights
and benefits for the poor to more quickly and assuredly become involved in representing par-
ties in major litigated cases, whose objective is a final decision favorable to the poor, concern-
ing the poor.
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C. Should Each Law School Require All Its Faculty Members,
Including Those Who Have Never Been Licensed to Practice Law,
to Perform Annually or Periodically at Least a Certain
Designated Minimum Number of Hours Providing, or Assisting
Others in Providing, Pro Bono Legal Services for the Poor, for
Other Deserving Clients or in Furtherance of Other Worthy
Causes?
Two law schools have reported that they have imposed such a re-
quirement on their full-time faculty members. 205 Some law schools have
reported that they "encourage" their faculty members to engage in pro
bono activities but apparently impose no sanction on any faculty member
who does not do So. 20 6
One argument in support of such a requirement is that more such
pro bono legal services are very much needed and all law school faculty
members should help fulfill this need. Even those law school faculty
members who never were licensed to practice law or whose license to
practice law has expired and not been renewed can and arguably should
be involved in helping fulfill this need as they can be of help by provid-
ing assistance to licensed lawyers who are principally responsible for
providing the legal services. The law school requirement that all their
full-time faculty members annually provide a certain designated amount
of time each year to providing pro bono legal services to the poor or
other deserving clients or causes also would constitute a message to law
firms and corporate law departments as to what they should be doing-if
we, the law schools, have such a pro bono requirement, you should too.
Another argument in support of the requirement is that if faculty pro
bono activities are made known to students-and they should be-this
would be a reminder to the students of a pro bono obligation that they
should assume, and competently seek to fulfill both while they are law
students and thereafter. Also, the likely diversity of faculty pro bono
endeavors would provide law students with varied examples of the dif-
205 The two law schools are Chapman University School of Law (no set number of pro
bono service hours required); and Charleston School of Law (30 hours of pro bono service
hours required every three years). ABA. PRO BoNo DIRECTORY, supra note 198.
206 On Harvard Law School, the ABA report includes the following:
It is expected that all members of the regular, full-time teaching faculty will
perform, on the average, at least a similar amount of pro bono activity to what is
required of students (40 hours). Since all members of the faculty are not practicing
lawyers, the qualifying services for faculty members should be rendered to the listed
organizations in the fields of their respective expertness. The aspirational goal with
respect to faculty service is included to stress the professional value of pro bono
service. Since there are no sanctions or reporting requirements, faculty members
seeking to comply are expected to follow their own common sense in deciding to
their own satisfaction whether they had met the guidelines.
Id.
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ferent kinds of pro bono needs, and what is required to fulfill those
needs.
An argument against the above requirement is that it could require
many law school faculty members to divert time from teaching and
scholarly research and writing that is of greater importance to them than
their pro bono legal services would be. This faculty time diversion also
could be costly to the law schools, as their teaching and scholarly re-
sources would be reduced or to prevent this resource reduction they
would have to employ and pay additional faculty members. If the law
schools avoided these costs to them by requiring all their full-time
faculty members to engage in pro bono activities in addition to what had
been, prior to the requirement, the time expected of them in teaching and
scholarly research and writing, this could extensively and unjustifiably
interfere with the faculty members' family, recreational or other non-
work related activities.
Proposal
No law school should require all its full-time faculty members to
annually or periodically provide any amount of time to providing or as-
sisting others in providing pro bono legal services for the poor, for other
deserving persons or for worthy causes. But each law school should, to
the extent it considers it reasonable to do so, require certain of its full-
time faculty members to regularly provide pro bono legal services for the
poor, other worthy individuals, or worthy causes or assist others in doing
so. Also, each law school, to the extent it considers it reasonable to do
so, should encourage each of its faculty members, full-time and part-
time, to regularly provide pro bono legal services for the poor, other wor-
thy individuals or worthy causes or assist others in doing so, but no
faculty member should be censured for not doing so.
The above proposal, if adopted, in effect imposes a mandatory pro
bono service obligation on all full-time faculty members of a law school
if reasonable exceptions are made, each law school having considerable
discretion as to what those exceptions would be. Examples of faculty
members who it presumably would be reasonable for each law school to
except from both the service obligation and law school encouragement
obligation are the following: faculty members whose involvement in pro
bono service endeavors would seriously encroach on their very demand-
ing and time-consuming law school administrative duties; faculty mem-
bers currently involved in major very demanding and time-consuming
legal research projects, projects that would be seriously handicapped if
the faculty members involved in them diverted time to pro bono endeav-
ors; and part-time faculty members, with non-law school employers, em-
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ployers who would greatly resent any diversion of their employees' time
to pro bono endeavors.
D. As a Prerequisite to Graduation Should Every Law School
Require that Each of Its Students, while Enrolled as a Law
Student, Have Performed a Designated Number of Hours of
Pro Bono Services for the Poor, for Other Deserving
Clients or in Furtherance of Some Other Worthy Cause?
A minority of law schools have considered participation of law stu-
dents in some form of pro bono activity, whether in legal service courses
or some other pro bono programs, so desirable that they have adopted a
requirement that as a condition to graduation each law student must have
engaged in a set number of hours of pro bono services. 207 An obvious
benefit of such a requirement is that it increases somewhat needed legal
services for deserving clients or worthy causes. By personally involving
more law students in performing pro bono services it also provides op-
portunities for more law students to become more knowledgeable about
the legal needs of the socially disadvantaged and the procedures involved
in helping to fulfill those needs. The law schools could also benefit by a
mandatory pro bono requirement as it would be viewed very favorably
by many of their alumni and by many other possible funding donors.
An argument in opposition to law schools imposing a mandatory
pro bono requirement on their students is that the requirement would be
deeply resented by some law students and this resentment could result in
opposition by these students to pro bono legal services, mandatory or
nonmandatory, opposition that could carry over and persist after they
became lawyers. Another anti-mandatory student pro bono service re-
quirement argument is that as pro bono services can be very time con-
207 Of the 176 law schools that responded to a recent ABA survey of law school pro bono
and public interest programs, twenty-one law schools as of 2008 required, as a condition to
graduation, that each student provide a certain number of hours of pro bono legal service; the
hours varied among the schools from twenty to seventy. The students may not be paid or
receive course credit for these services. For a listing of the twenty-one schools, see ABA PRO
BoNo DIRECTORY, supra note 198. Thirteen additional law schools reported that they had a
public service requirement for their students as a graduation requirement and four law schools
reported that they had a community service requirement for their students as a graduation
requirement. Id. On the pros and cons of mandatory pro bono for law students, see RHODE,
PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE, supra note 165 at 49-54; Committee on Legal Assis-
tance, Assn. of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Mandatory Law School Pro Bono Programs:
Preparing Students to Meet Their Ethical Obligations, 50 THE RECORD 170 (1995) (this report
is in favor of law schools requiring student participation in pro bono); Ass'N OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS, COMMISSION ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES, LEARNING
TO SERVE 3-4 (1999), available at http://www.aals.org/probono/report.html (stating that "[o]ur
central recommendation is that law schools make available to all law students at least once
during their law school careers a well-supervised pro bono opportunity and either require the
students' participation or find ways to attract the great majority of students to volunteer").
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suming; requiring such services on some students could be unduly and
unjustifiably burdensome on them. Examples of students on whom the
burden could be unduly and unjustifiably burdensome are many part-
time law students who hold full-time jobs while enrolled as law students
and law students committed to personally providing very extensive time
to care of their children when they, the parents, are enrolled as law
students.
Proposal
There should be no legal or accreditation requirement that any law
school impose a designated number of hours or other mandated pro bono
requirement of any kind on any of their students while enrolled as law
students. Whether or not to adopt a mandated pro bono service require-
ment of any kind on their students should be discretionary with each law
school.
How best to balance the arguments for and against a mandatory pro
bono requirement on law students can vary among law schools so the
decision as to whether or not to adopt, or adopt and sustain, such a re-
quirement should be discretionary with each law school. But every law
school should be fully aware of the potential advantages of adopting such
a requirement, and periodically should consider whether or not to adopt
such a requirement, or, if adopted, to expand the number of hours of pro
bono services that are required.
V. ISSUES CONCERNING ASSISTANCE TO POOR PERSONS
REPRESENTING THEMSELVES PRO SE IN CASES BEFORE THE
COURTS, OR IN MATTERS THAT MAY COME
BEFORE THE COURTS
As the number of poor persons in need of legal services who are
unable to obtain the needed legal services has escalated in recent
years, 208 more poor persons are representing themselves pro se in cases
before the courts or in matters likely to come before the courts. Pro se
representation by poor persons is particularly prevalent in litigated do-
mestic relations, child custody, landlord-tenant, small claims, and minor
criminal cases. 209 In some of these cases both the plaintiff and defendant
are pro se parties. Many persons who are able to pay for needed legal
services represent themselves pro se in cases before the courts or in mat-
ters that may come before the courts, and the usual motivation for their
doing so obviously is to avoid paying for the needed legal services. Un-
208 For major reasons for this see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
209 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 82 (2004) [RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE];
Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of
the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2047-69 (1988).
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doubtedly, however, a high proportion of pro se parties are poor persons
who represent themselves pro se not only because they cannot afford to
retain needed legal service providers but because they also were unaware
of available legal aid or other no cost to client legal service providers, or
because those providers were overbooked so could not provide the ser-
vices needed and requested of them.
In many U.S. communities limited assistance by some government
or private nonprofit organizations is made available at no fee or only a
modest fee to parties requesting assistance and who are representing
themselves pro se in cases, or preparing to representing themselves pro
se in cases. 210 Obvious objectives of each of these forms of assistance is
enabling pro se parties to be more knowledgeable and competent to re-
present themselves and reducing the risk of an adverse decision by the
court because of the pro se parties' lack of knowledge or competence to
provide or properly provide some essential services that may be needed
in their representation. A substantial percentage of those who seek such
assistance are poor persons representing themselves pro se or who are
preparing to do so. 2 1 1
Much of this assistance is provided by pro se assistance centers.
Each of these centers, often referred to as clinics, provide one or more
forms of assistance to pro se parties at no fee or only a very modest fee-
some of the centers limit their assistance to matters before a particular
court or concerning a particular field of law. 2 12 There are centers that
also make helpful information available to pro se parties at kiosks, by
telephone, or online. 213 Some of the pro se assistance centers have been
established by courts and are staffed by court personnel, some of them
also by volunteer lawyers whose assistance is provided pro bono.2 14 Bar
associations or legal aid organizations have established and operate most
210 See Margaret M. Barry, Assessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response
to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 1879, 1891-1918 (1999).
211 See id. at 1884.
212 On the pro se services provided by particular pro se assistance centers, see JONA
GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION, A REPORT AND
GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 73-104 (1998); Brenda S. Adams, "Unbun-
dled Legal Services": A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachu-
setts Courts, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV. 303, 322-32 (2005); Barry, supra note 210, at 1891-1918;
Engler, supra note 209 at 2057-69; Amanda Bronstad, Federal Courts React to the Tide of
Pro Se Litigants, NAT'L. L.J. 6 (Mar. 9, 2009); Judith L. Maute & Cheryl Lynn Wofford Hill,
Delivery Systems Under Construction: Ongoing Works in Progress, 72 U. Mo. K.C. L. Rev.
377, 394-407 (2003); Frances H. Thompson, Access to Justice in Idaho, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.
REV. 1313 (2002).
213 See Barry, supra note 210, at 1895, 1915; Margaret B. Flaherty, Note, How Courts
Help You Help Yourself the Internet and the Pro Se Litigant, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 91 (2002);
Maute & Wofford, supra note 212, at 412-20.
214 See, e.g., Goldschmidt et al., supra note 212, at 68-85. Some of the court-initiated
programs charge modest fees for some of the services they provide pro se parties, i.e., program
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of the other centers, many of them with staffing help from volunteer
lawyers whose assistance is provided pro bono. Funding of the centers
comes principally from the organizations operating them. Assistance to
pro se parties at no fee or only a modest fee also is provided by other
legal service providers unaffiliated with or not acting for a pro se assis-
tance center, among them some law school legal clinics, some legal aid
agencies, and some other legal service organizations whose activities are
concentrated principally on providing legal services to the poor. This
assistance is provided at no fee or only a very modest fee.
In addition to limited assistance to pro se parties by pro se assis-
tance centers, limited assistance to pro se parties is provided by many
judges when pro se parties appear before them. There is, however, con-
siderable variation among judges as to what assistance, if any, each judge
will provide pro se parties when it becomes apparent that the parties
before them are in need of help. Judges who provide assistance to pro se
parties generally will do so irrespective of whether or not the pro se par-
ties are rich or poor, but as a substantial percentage of pro se parties are
poor many pro se parties who are poor obviously are receiving assistance
from judges. Other court personnel, particularly court clerks, in the
course of their daily duties, also often provide helpful information about
judicial proceedings to pro se parties before the court to which the court
personnel are assigned, but they generally are prohibited from providing
legal advice.2 15 Many such court personnel also assist some pro se par-
ties by selecting and filling in needed court forms or advising the parties
on how to fill in the forms. 216 If a court is very understaffed in numbers
of judges and as a result its judges are very overworked, the judges are
less likely to provide assistance to pro se parties if doing so would add to
the judges' workload. Extensive understaffing of court clerks and com-
parable court personnel assigned to a court is likely to have a similar
result-less assistance by such court personnel to pro se parties if this
would add to the court personnel's workload. Judges also may refuse to
provide assistance to pro se parties if doing so would, they believe, be
unjustifiably prejudicial to the pro se parties' opponents and thereby vio-
late the impartiality and fairness obligation of judges. 217
kiosk user fees of ten dollars by a program in Utah, up to twenty dollars by a program in
Arizona. Id. at 77.
215 See Engler, supra note 209, at 2026-27, 2036-40; RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra
note 209, at 83. On the ambiguity of the concept of legal advice when provided by court
personnel to parties in cases before the court, see John M. Graecen, "No Legal Advice from
Court Personnel" What Does That Mean?, 34 JUDGES J. 10, 14-15 (1995); see also Gold-
schmidt et al., supra note 212, at 41-45.
216 See Goldschmidt et al., supra note 212, at 35-40.
217 On the impartiality and fairness obligation of judges see, for example, MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, Pt. A & B (2007), which have been adopted as a court rule by
courts in many U.S. jurisdictions.
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Assistance to pro se parties raises a number of issues. One issue is
should pro se parties who can afford to retain counsel, but chose not to
do so, receive assistance from pro se assistance centers or others at no
charge? Arguably this assistance is an undeserved subsidy. Another is-
sue is should legal aid and other organizations that concentrate on pro-
viding legal services for the poor increase the number of poor people
they can assist by providing only limited legal services to many of these
poor persons, those assisted providing the remaining services pro se.
There also is an issue as to whether judges should be authorized, and if
authorized required, to provide needed assistance to pro se parties. The
trend has been not only to authorize judicial assistance to pro se parties
but to expand and clarify the authorized judicial assistance.218 Consider-
able uncertainty, however, remains as to exactly which pro se party assis-
tance efforts by judges are authorized and which are not. Assistance to
pro se parties by court personnel also raises troublesome issues: whether
court personnel are sufficiently knowledgeable, competent, and qualified
to provide the assistance; and if they provide such assistance, whether
they are benefiting pro se parties and thereby violating the impartiality
required of court personnel as well as judges.
A. What Assistance, If Any, Should Pro Se Assistance Centers, Law
School Legal Clinics, and Legal Aid and Other Nonprofit Legal
Service Organizations Whose Activities are Concentrated
Principally on Providing Legal Services for the Poor Provide
Affluent Pro Se Parties Who Choose to Represent Themselves in
Cases Before the Courts or in Matters that May Come Before the
Courts and in Doing so Request Assistance from One of the
Above Organizations? Also, If Any of the Above Organizations
Should Provide Assistance to Affluent Pro Se Parties Should the
Assisting Organization Have the Option of Charging the Pro Se
Party a Modest Fee for the Assistance Provided, a Fee that if
Charged Would Be No Greater than the Fee the Provider
Charges Poor Pro Se Parties for Whom the Assisting
Organization Provides Similar Assistance?
Arguably any assistance to affluent pro se parties by any of the
above organizations is an unjustified subsidy, especially if the assistance
would add to the financial costs of the assisting organization or reduce
the volume or quality of the assisting organization's other activities. A
counter argument is that the right of self-representation is such an impor-
tant legal right that all of the above organizations, when competent and
legally authorized to do so, should provide assistance requested of them
218 On this trend, see Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and
the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NomE DAME J.L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y 367 (2008).
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by pro se parties representing themselves or seeking to represent them-
selves in cases before the courts and these organizations should do so
irrespective of how poor or affluent any of the requesting pro se parties
may be. Moreover, if a fee is charged by any of the above organizations
to pro se parties for assistance provided, the fee should be modest and be
the same for rich or poor persons receiving similar assistance.
Proposal
Affluent pro se parties in cases before the courts or in matters that
may come before the courts should receive assistance at no fee or only a
modest fee when they request assistance from assistance centers, law
school legal clinics, or legal aid and other legal service organizations
whose activities are concentrated principally on providing legal services
for the poor if the assistance can be provided at little or no cost to the
assisting organization in time or money,219 and if the assisting organiza-
tions providing the assistance are competent and legally authorized to
provide the assistance. If, however, assistance to affluent pro se parties
would result in substantial cost to the assisting organization in time or
money, the assisting organization should have the option to accept or
reject requests by affluent pro se parties for assistance. If requests are
accepted, the option to charge an appropriate fee for the assistance pro-
vided should be available. The fee should be comparable to what a law-
yer in private practice would charge an affluent client for similar
services. An affluent pro se party is a party with sufficient available
financial resources to pay for any and all legal services that would be
needed if the pro se party chose not to proceed pro se in a case before a
court, or in a matter that may come before a court, but instead retained
competent legal counsel to provide all needed legal services with the
expectation of paying counsel the usual market rate for the legal services
provided.
219 Examples of assistance to affluent pro se parties requesting assistance from one of the
designated nonprofit organizations that may require little or no time or money cost to the
assisting organization are: an assisting organization employee, following a brief discussion
with a pro se party, referring the pro se party to a source of needed information available by
telephone, online or at nearby kiosks, or by providing the pro se party with a needed legal form
for the pro se party to fill out and helping the pro se party in filling out the form. On informa-
tion that may be available by telephone, online, or at nearby kiosks see supra note 213 and
accompanying text. Some relevant legal advice on the law also might be provided to an afflu-
ent pro se party at little or no cost, such as whether or not postponement of a set court date is
possible or the statute of limitations period applicable to a particular type of contract breach, if
the period is clearly set forth in a statute and is not being challenged. Some of the above
organizations also may consider it desirable to provide assistance to a pro se party despite the
high cost in time or money in doing so. For example, a law school legal clinic may do so
because the assistance involves an unusual legal problem and, even though assisting the pro se
party would require extensive expenditure of time by clinic students and faculty members, the
assistance would provide educational benefits to students.
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The right of all persons to represent themselves pro se is such an
important right that many nonprofit organizations should be active in
providing assistance to affluent pro se parties who choose to represent
themselves in cases before the courts or in matters that may come before
the courts. The above proposal briefly outlines when, and at what fee, if
any, certain kinds of nonprofit organizations should be active, or have
the option of being active, in assisting affluent pro se parties in cases
before the courts or in matters that may come before the courts. The
proposal seeks to balance the interests of affluent pro se parties and their
right to self-representation with the interests of others who are served by
the nonprofit organizations, many of whom are poor persons in need of
legal representation and with a right to legal representation.
B. Should Many More Poor Persons in Need of Legal Services
Receive Only Limited (Unbundled) Legal Services from Legal Aid
and Other Organizations that Concentrate on Providing Legal
Services for the Poor, Those Poor Persons Receiving Only
Limited Legal Services Providing the Remaining Services Pro Se?
The provision of limited legal services to pro se parties is often re-
ferred to as unbundling of legal services, especially when engaged in by
lawyers in private law practice who are paid for the limited services pro-
vided.220 Unbundling is an increasing form of legal services by lawyers
who are paid for the limited services provided and some organizations
that concentrate on providing legal services to the poor are also provid-
ing some unbundled legal services to their clients at no fee or only a very
modest fee. When legal services are unbundled the lawyer provides only
one legal service, or frequently several legal services, the client provid-
ing the remaining services pro se. A legal service that the lawyer com-
monly provides in unbundled situations is the drafting of documents to
be presented to the court. Among other services, one or more of which
the lawyer may perform in unbundled situations, are representing the cli-
ent in a trial or other proceedings before a judge, negotiations with the
opposing party, legal research, obtaining factual evidence, and legal ad-
vice. When legal services are unbundled the lawyer often is legally re-
quired to file an appearance. 22 1
220 On unbundling see FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES, A GUIDE TO
DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE (2000) [hereinafter UNBUNDLING]; Forrest S. Mos-
ten, Unbundling Legal Services, Serving Clients Within Their Ability to Pay, 40 JUDGES J. 15,
17 (2001); RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 209, at 100-01. For statistical data on the
volume of pro se representation in cases before the courts in recent years see Nina Ingwer
VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phe-
nomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 988-91 (2007).
221 Failure of a lawyer to file an appearance with the court when drafting pleadings or
other documents for a pro se party when the documents are filed in court is often referred to as
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The principal argument in support of all legal aid and other organi-
zations that concentrate on providing legal services to the poor providing
only unbundled legal services to many or more of their clients, the clients
providing the remaining services pro se, is that this would enable each of
these organizations to very substantially increase the number of poor per-
sons to whom they could provide at least some legal services. Further, it
would result in far fewer poor persons that the organizations would have
to deny providing any legal services.
A counter argument is that many of the pro se clients would be
much less effective in providing the remaining legal services than if the
assisting organization provided all the needed legal services, and as a
result many more pro se clients would fail to achieve their litigation
objectives.222 This could mean that on balance it would be preferable if
the legal services organization provided full representation to fewer poor
clients. Another counter argument is that the pro se clients receiving
limited legal services could frequently become effective in providing the
remaining legal services if the assisting organization also held sufficient
advisory or training sessions with the pro se clients. But, for these ses-
sions to enable the clients to effectively provide the remaining legal ser-
vices it frequently would be necessary for the advisory and training
sessions to be more time consuming and costly to the assisting organiza-
tion than if the organization provided full representation to the clients.
Proposal
Most legal aid and other organizations that concentrate on providing
legal services to the poor should provide only limited (unbundled) legal
services to many of the poor persons in need of legal services who have
applied to the organizations for assistance, those poor persons receiving
"ghostwriting," as the judge usually assumes that the pro se party drafted the documents with-
out assistance, and the judge may be more lenient in determining the meaning and adequacy of
the documents. On this leniency, see Fern Fisher-Brandveen & Rochelle Klempner, Unbun-
dled Legal Services: Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107,
1122 (2002); John C. Rothermich, Ethical and Procedural Implications of "Ghostwriting" for
Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687 (1989).
But see Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145 (2002)
(concluding that ghostwriting does not give pro se litigants an undue advantage.); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-4461 (2007) (concluding that ghost-
writing does not violate any of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and states that
the Committee does not share the concern that ghostwritten pleadings or other ghostwritten
documents filed in court result in the pro se parties receiving an unfair benefit).
Unbundling also increases the risks of malpractice liability of lawyers providing unbun-
dled legal services to pro se parties. See Fisher-Brandveen & Klempner, supra note 221 at
1114-16; Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-
Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 295, 306-08 (1997); Mosten, supra note
220, at 16-18.
222 See Rothermich, supra note 221, at 2708-19.
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only limited legal services, and providing the remaining legal services
pro se. If an organization has been providing such limited legal services
to some poor applicants for legal services, with the applicants expected
to provide the remaining services pro se, the organization should increase
the number of poor persons to whom the organization is providing only
limited legal services. However, before any of the organizations offer to
provide such limited legal services to any poor applicant, organization
personnel should have determined, following a sufficiently thorough
evaluation of the applicant's capability and legal needs, that there is a
sufficient probability that the poor applicant is able to competently pro-
vide the remaining legal services pro se. If it is determined, following
the evaluation, that the applicant is not sufficiently competent, the organ-
ization should, if it seems merited and reasonable for the organization to
do so, provide instruction and training to the applicant directed at making
the applicant sufficiently competent to provide the remaining legal ser-
vices pro se. If the applicant ultimately is determined not to be suffi-
ciently competent to provide the remaining legal services pro se, the
organization should offer to fully represent the applicant, refer the appli-
cant to another legal service provider that provides legal services to poor
people, or regretfully reject the applicant's request for further assistance.
Even some public defender and other organizations that concentrate on
providing legal services to poor persons charged with crimes may have
such a shortage of staff that they cannot fully and adequately represent
all the poor defendants that they are expected to represent and there is no
other available qualified source that will do So. 22 3 If a criminal defense
organization for the poor encounters such a situation it should give seri-
ous consideration to providing limited legal services to some defendants,
following a sufficiently thorough evaluation of each such defendant's ca-
pability and defense prospects, with the defendants providing the remain-
ing services pro se.
The provision of limited legal services by lawyers to clients who
provide the remaining legal services pro se is permitted under the widely
adopted ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(c): "A
lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is rea-
sonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent."
Rule 1.2(c) is applicable whether the lawyers are paid for the legal ser-
vices they provide or provide the services at no fee. Some of the other
widely adopted ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also are par-
ticularly relevant to lawyers who provide limited legal services to pro se
clients and specify what conduct by these lawyers may be necessary to
223 On the constitutional right of defendants in criminal cases to counsel and the shortage
of counsel in many jurisdictions for poor persons who are defendants in criminal cases see
supra notes 8, 11, and accompanying text.
ADEQUATE LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR
comply with the rules. Among such rules are Rule 1.1 which provides
that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Com-
petent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation"; Rule 1.3
which provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence in
representing a client"; and Rule 1.4(b) which provides that "[a] lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." 2 2 4
C. What Assistance, If Any, Should a Judge Provide Pro Se Parties
in Cases Assigned to the Judge and Should a Pro Se Party's
Economic Status be a Relevant Consideration by a Judge in
Determining Whether or Not the Judge Will Provide Assistance to
a Pro Se Party, How Much Assistance, or the Kind of Assistance?
An argument has been advanced that if literally applied without ex-
ception could resolve each of the issues just above. The argument is that
a judge should provide no assistance to any pro se parties, poor or afflu-
ent, because doing so would constitute a violation of the judge's very
basic and fundamental duty of impartiality and fairness. This duty is
very succinctly set forth in Rule 2.2 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct that has been adopted by many U.S. jurisdictions. Rule 2.2,
entitled Impartiality and Fairness, provides that "[a] judge shall uphold
and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially." 225 A counter argument to the impartiality and fairness ar-
gument is that if applied without exception or qualification to all cases
assigned to a judge in which there are one or more pro se parties in need
of assistance that the judge could provide, the result would be that many
of these pro se parties would be unable to represent themselves pro se
adequately-a very fundamental access to justice right. This argument is
particularly convincing if the pro se parties are poor, were unaware of
help that might be available from legal aid or other providers of legal
224 Each of these rules, including Rule 1.2(c), is highly ambiguous as to what the term
"reasonable" means. Comments to some of the rules are somewhat helpful in clarifying the
meaning of "reasonable." See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7; R. 1.3
cmt. 3; R. 1.4 cmt. 5 & 6.
225 Recently-added comment 4 to Canon 2, Rule 2.2, however, states this: "It is not a
violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants
the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Ca-
non 2, R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2007); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon 2, R. 2.3A
(adding the following to judicial duties that obviously are applicable to assistance by a judge to
pro se parties: "A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including administrative
duties, without bias or prejudice.").
On arguments for and against judges providing assistance to pro se parties, with many
case citations, see Engler, supra note 209 at 2012-15, 2028-31; see also Engler, supra note
218 (stressing the recent trend toward increased support for a more active judicial role in
providing assistance to pro se parties).
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assistance to the poor or had sought help from such providers but were
denied needed assistance because the providers were accepting no addi-
tional clients due to lack of sufficient staff. An argument against a judge
assisting pro se parties on some aspects of some cases is that the assis-
tance could result in the final decision in each such case being delayed, a
result that might be unacceptable because it would be very disadvanta-
geous to the assisted pro se parties' opponents. 226 It also could result in
increasing the case overload of judges in some high-volume courts, such
as some small claims, housing, or family courts in some big cities-
courts before whom many of the parties are self-represented and in need
of assistance in doing so. One solution to the case overload problem is
more judges for courts with high case volumes and a shortage of
judges. 227 However, it seems inevitable, due largely to funding
shortages, that many high case volume U.S. courts not only will continue
to have too few judges, but that the shortage may become even more
acute in the future.
Determining what the proper solution should be to the issue of what
assistance, if any, a judge should provide pro se parties in cases assigned
to the judge can be a very difficult undertaking. The solution should
recognize that both the impartiality and fairness argument and the pro se
access to justice argument have merit. It also should recognize that there
are many factual variables that are relevant and should be considered in
developing a solution to the issue. The factual variables include: whether
or not the pro se party in need of assistance requested assistance of the
judge, the capability of the pro se party to understand assistance propos-
als made by the judge, the competence of the pro se party to implement
some of the assistance proposals made by the judge, the time available to
the judge to properly prepare and provide assistance to pro se parties
with more complex legal or factual problems, whether or not the judge
has available qualified staff personnel to whom the judge could assign
the duty of providing or implementing assistance to pro se parties, and
the impact that the judge's assistance may have on the pro se parties
opponents' interests and the justifications, if any, for such impact.
226 The delay often would be due to the added time required for the judge to determine
what assistance to provide. For example, the assistance would require extensive legal research
by the judge. Or the delay might be due to the added time required for the pro se party to
obtain the help from other sources recommended by the assisting judge.
227 There also are a variety of techniques or procedures available to many trial judges for
reducing the overload problem when one or both parties are self-represented. On these tech-
niques or procedures, see Mark A. Junas et al., Self-Represented Cases, 15 Techniques for
Saving Money in Tough Times, 49 JUDGES J. 18 (2010).
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Proposal
In each U.S. jurisdiction, the appropriate court or courts legally au-
thorized to do so, should adopt guidelines as to the assistance that a judge
should and should not provide pro se parties in cases assigned to the
judge. The appropriate court should be the highest court with legal au-
thority to adopt such guidelines and that court, if legally authorized to do
so, may delegate that authority to lower or specialty courts, which should
then adopt such guidelines. The guidelines should permit assistance to
pro se parties irrespective of the pro se parties' income or wealth. The
guidelines should not disfavor more affluent pro se parties merely be-
cause of their affluence. The guidelines also should be sufficiently de-
tailed to explicitly cover what the judge should or should not do in many
of the variable factual situations that can arise pertaining to assistance by
a judge to pro se parties. And the guidelines should reflect, to the extent
merited, both the obligation of judges to be impartial and fair and the
access to justice aspect of the pro se representation right. The guidelines
should be detailed and may vary depending on the types of cases that
come before the court to which the judge is assigned and whether or not
judges in that court are assigned an overload of cases, more cases than
they can fully and adequately consider, in many instances even if each
judge devotes an excessive number of hours to adjudicative duties. To
increase the prospects of judges understanding and complying with the
guidelines there should be informative sessions on the guidelines availa-
ble to all parties. Attendance at the informative sessions should be
mandatory for all judges shortly after the initial adoption of the guide-
lines, thereafter attendance should be mandatory only for new judges,
those without prior experience as judges, or if major changes are made in
the guidelines. There also should be oversight procedures in effect for
determining whether or not each judge is complying with the guidelines,
and judges should be subject to appropriate sanctions for persistent fail-
ure to comply with the guidelines.
The above proposal as to guidelines should be adopted and imple-
mented by appropriate U.S. courts, and detailed guidelines concerning
judicial assistance to pro se parties should be in effect in every court and
applicable to every judge in each court. There are so many relevant vari-
ables as to the circumstances in which a judge should provide assistance
and what assistance should be rendered to pro se parties in cases assigned
to the judge that each judge should have considerable discretion in deter-
mining whether or not to provide assistance, and what assistance to pro
se parties. However, there should be limits on the discretion of a judge
as to what kinds of assistance, if any, the judge provides pro se parties in
cases assigned to the judge, and the guidelines should set limits on that
discretion-limits that the judge should adhere to.
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There is some state and federal case law that can provide helpful
guidance as to what assistance, if any, a judge should and should not
provide pro se parties in certain situations.228 But the case law decisions
are scattered over time and among different jurisdictions, the facts to
which each decision applies are in most cases quite limited, and the fac-
tual scope of the authoritative principals stated by the court in justifying
its decisions are in most cases ambiguous. More comprehensive and cur-
rently relevant judicial guidance is needed-guidance that a proper set of
judicial guidelines could provide. 229 Such guidelines, often referred to as
protocols or best practices, have been adopted in a few U.S. jurisdictions
for some courts or some judicial proceedings and can be helpful models
for other courts in drafting guidelines for their judges. Massachusetts's
Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Liti-
gants is a particularly helpful model. 230
228 For brief summaries of some of these cases, see Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial
Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGES J. 16, 19-23 (2003).
229 On the guidelines issue see CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATION, PosrION
PAPER ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION (2000) (recommending increased consideration and
action by the Conference of State Court Administrators and Conference of Chief Justices to the
needs of self-represented litigants); NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON
PROTOCOL FOR JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND TRIAL OF CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED
LrrlGANTS IN HOUSING COURT (2006) (including a detailed set of proposed protocols for the
New York City Housing Court); Engler, supra note 218; Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assis-
tance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons From the Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J.
INT'L. L. 601, 625-29 (2008-2009) (considering guidelines adopted by the Canadian Judicial
Council and the Australian Family Court); CYNTHIA GRAY, REACHING OUT OR OVERREACHING,
JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LrrlGANTS, STATE JUSTICE INST. (2005), available at
www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/Pro%20se%201itigants%20final.pdf (including a detailed list of pro-
posed best practices for cases involving self-represented litigants).
230 See, e.g., SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL GUIDELINES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL
COURT STEERING COMMITTEE ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR
CIVIL HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LrIGANTS WITH COMMENTARY (2006) availa-
ble at http://www.mass.gov/courts/judguidelinescivhearingstoc.html. [hereinafter MASSACHU-
SETTS JUDICIAL GUIDELINES]. The introduction states that:
The Guidelines were developed specifically for interactions with self-repre-
sented litigants in civil cases in which there is no right to counsel. Although the
Guidelines may be a helpful resource in criminal cases and civil cases in which there
is a right to counsel, they must be applied in light of the special considerations those
cases present.
The Guidelines are advisory. The issues and challenges presented by self-rep-
resented litigants may vary in different court departments. Judges, therefore, are
encouraged to use the Guidelines in a way that best suits the needs of their court and
the litigants before them. To the extent that there is any conflict between the Guide-
lines and the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code governs.
Id.
The commentary states:
This Commentary is intended to supply suggestions and resources for judges
who wish to exercise their discretion consistent with the Guidelines. It was authored
by the Subcommittee on Judicial Guidelines of the Supreme Judicial Court Steering
Committee on Self-Represented Litigants, and endorsed by the full Committee. It
has not been reviewed by the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court.
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D. What Assistance, If Any, Should Court Personnel, Other than
Judges, Provide Pro Se Parties in Cases Before the Court to
Which the Court Personnel is Assigned?
Court clerks also often provide helpful information to parties who
come before the court, including many pro se parties, but court clerks are
quite universally prohibited from giving legal advice to any parties. 2 3 1
As court employees the clerks should be impartial and giving legal ad-
vice often would be indicative of partiality to the party receiving the
advice. 232 Also, most court clerks are nonlawyers, and if nonlawyer
clerks provide legal advice to those who come before the court they
would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. However, a
troublesome issue is what constitutes legal advice, as the term is highly
ambiguous, with considerable uncertainty as to just what information
provided others is legal advice. 2 3 3 Most court clerks apparently will not
provide information to parties before the court that the clerks consider to
be legal advice. But clerks in many courts will assist pro se parties by
selecting and filling in needed court forms, assistance that may be the
unauthorized practice of law.
Arguments can be advanced both in opposition to and in support of
court personnel, other than judges, providing assistance to pro se parties
in cases before the court to which the non-judge court personnel are as-
signed. Some of these arguments are similar to those applicable to
judges. Arguments against court personnel who are not judges providing
needed assistance to pro se parties, other than noncontroversial informa-
tion such as directions to the courtroom where a party's case will be
heard or the scheduled date and time for trial of a party's case, include
the following: the assistance would violate the fairness and impartiality
obligation of all court personnel to all opposing parties in cases before
the court where the court personnel are assigned, and the fairness and
impartiality obligation is not restricted to court personnel who are judges;
if the assistance needed includes legal advice, court personnel providing
Id.
The Massachusetts Guidelines cover the following: 1. General Practice (1.1. Plain En-
glish, 1.2. Language Barriers, 1.3. Legal representation, 1.4. application of the law, 1.5. Mater-
ials and services for self-represented litigants), 2. Guidelines for Pre-Hearing Interaction (2.1.
Trial process, 2.2. Settlement, 2.3. Alternative dispute resolution), 3. Guidelines for Con-
ducting Hearings (3.1. Courtroom Decorum, 3.2. Evidence, 3.3. Right of Self-Representation,
3.4. Approval of Settlement Agreements), 4. Guidelines for Post-Hearing Interaction (4.1. Is-
suing the Decision, 4.2. Appeal). See id.
A shorter set of guidelines for judicial officers during hearings involving pro se parties
has been adopted in Minnesota and are reprinted in Albrecht et al., supra note 228, at 18.
231 See Graecen, supra note 215, at 10.
232 On the obligation of court clerk impartiality, see Graecen, supra note 215, at 14-15;
see also Goldschmidt et al., supra note 212, at 41-45.
233 See Goldschmidt et al., supra note 212, at 34-35; Graecen, supra note 215, at 10-12.
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the assistance who are not lawyers, and most such personnel are not law-
yers, would be acting illegally as they are engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law; and many of the court personnel in every court, includ-
ing many who have been providing such assistance, lack the knowledge
and ability to competently provide the assistance needed without undue
risk that their assistance will be inadequate and even detrimental to the
parties they are assisting. Arguments in support of court personnel who
are not judges, providing assistance to pro se parties before the courts to
which the non-judge court personnel are assigned, include: the assistance
would enable many more pro se parties, including many who are poor, to
effectively and properly represent themselves pro se in the proceedings
before the court; the assistance frequently would eliminate the need for a
judge to provide assistance to pro se parties in cases assigned to the
judge. This could not only reduce the time a judge must spend on some
cases, but it would eliminate the possibility of a judge being accused of
impartiality breaches by providing assistance to pro se parties. Judges
are far more vulnerable to such accusations if they assist pro se parties
than are other court personnel who provide the same assistance to such
parties. The accusations, even though unjustifiable, can be more harmful
to the justice system if directed at judges than if directed at other court
personnel who are providing the same assistance.
Proposal
In each U.S. jurisdiction, the appropriate court or courts legally au-
thorized to do so, should adopt a court rule as to the assistance that court
personnel should and should not provide pro se parties in cases before
the court to which the court personnel are assigned. The appropriate
court should be the highest court with legal authority to adopt such a
court rule and that court, if legally authorized to do so, may delegate that
authority to lower or specialty courts which should then adopt such a
rule. The rule should authorize assistance by court personnel to pro se
parties irrespective of the pro se parties' income or wealth. The rule also
should be sufficiently detailed to explicitly cover what different court
personnel, including court personnel who are lawyers and those who are
not lawyers, may do to assist pro se parties. The rule should define the
term "legal advice" and should modify unauthorized practice laws to per-
mit certain types of nonlawyer court personnel to provide specified kinds
of legal services to pro se parties, including certain kinds of legal advice,
that without such modification would be the unauthorized practice of law
if provided pro se parties by nonlawyer court personnel. 234 Attendance
at training sessions as to what the applicable rule does and does not per-
234 On the ambiguity of what constitutes legal advice, see Graecen, supra note 215.
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mit should be required of all personnel authorized by the rule to provide
assistance to pro se parties.
A helpful court rule model on assistance that court personnel, other
than judges, are permitted to provide pro se parties is the Florida Su-
preme Court's Rule 12-750, Family Self-Help Programs. 235 Although
this rule is applicable only to Florida family courts for which a self-help
program has been established, many of its provisions, particularly the
Services Provided section and the Limitations on Services section, could
be helpful models for any court in any U.S. jurisdiction in drafting a rule
for assistance of pro se parties by court personnel other than judges. 2 36
Another helpful model is the self-help friendly court as proposed by
235 FLA. R. OF COURT, FAMILY LAw R. OF P. R. 12.750 (2009).
236 Id. The Florida Rule 12.750 sections on Services Provided and Limitations on Ser-
vices are as follows:
(c) Services Provided. Self-help personnel may: (1) encourage self-represented
litigants to obtain legal advice; (2) provide information about available pro bono
legal services, low cost legal services, legal aid programs, and lawyer referral ser-
vices; (3) provide information about available approved forms, without providing
advice or recommendation as to any specific course of action; (4) provide approved
forms and approved instructions on how to complete the forms; (5) engage in limited
oral communications to assist a person in the completion of blanks on approved
forms; (6) record information provided by a self-represented litigant on approved
forms; (7) provide, either orally or in writing, definitions of legal terminology from
widely accepted legal dictionaries or other dictionaries without advising whether or
not a particular definition is applicable to the self-represented litigant's situation; (8)
provide, either orally in writing, citations of statues and rules, without advising
whether or not a particular statute or rule is applicable to the self-represented liti-
gant's situation; (9) provide docketed case information; (10) provide general infor-
mation about court process, practice, and procedure; (11) provide information about
mediation, required parenting courses, and courses for children of divorcing parents;
(12) provide, either orally or in writing, information from local rules or administra-
tive orders; (13) provide general information about local court operations; (14) pro-
vide information about community services; and (15) facilitate the setting of
hearings.
(d) Limitations on Services. Self-help personnel shall not: (1) provide legal
advice or recommend a specific course of action for a self-represented litigant; (2)
provide interpretation of legal terminology, statutes, rules, orders, cases, or the con-
stitution; (3) provide information that must be kept confidential by statute, rule, or
case law; (4) deny a litigant's access to the court; (5) encourage or discourage litiga-
tion; (6) record information on forms for a self-represented litigant, except as other-
wise provided by this rule; (7) engage in oral communications other than those
reasonably necessary to elicit factual information to complete the blanks on forms
except as otherwise authorized by this rule; (8) perform legal research for litigants;
(9) represent litigants in court; and (10) lead litigants to believe that they are repre-
senting them as lawyers in any capacity or induce the public to rely upon them for
legal advice.
Id.
Among helpful comments following Rule 12.750 are these:
Subdivision (c)(3). In order to avoid the practice of law, the self-help personnel
should not recommend a specific course of action.
Subdivision (c)(5). Self-help personnel should not suggest the specific infor-
mation to be included in the blanks on the forms. Oral communications between the
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Richard Zorza in a publication of the National Center for State Courts. 2 3 7
This court model includes proposals for a broad and well-trained self-
help team for assisting pro se parties, a caseflow assistance process help-
ful in preparing the pro se litigant for each step in the litigation process,
and redesigned courthouses and available technology to make them more
helpful to pro se parties.
CONCLUSION
The shortage of adequate legal services for the poor in need of such
services has long prevailed throughout the United States and the shortage
may become even greater in the future. It is one of this country's most
serious unresolved problems. In very general terms what needs to be
done to substantially reduce this shortage is:
* Enhance throughout the United States recognition of the serious-
ness and present and prospective adverse consequences of the
current and continued shortage in adequate legal services for the
poor. Not only should lawyers, judges, and legislators persist-
ently be reminded of the shortage and its adverse consequences,
but so should members of the general public, as widespread pub-
lic recognition of the adverse implications of a serious social
problem often leads to greater and more successful efforts to re-
solve the problem.
* Expand and intensify efforts to reduce the shortage of adequate
legal services for the poor throughout the United States, includ-
ing enhanced funding of such services and an enhanced volume
of such services provided by qualified legal service personnel
and organizations at a new fee. It merits reiteration here that the
term "adequate legal services for the poor" as used in this Article
means services that are sufficiently comprehensive and are com-
petently performed.
self-help personnel and the self-represented litigant should be focused on the type of
information the form is designed to elicit.
Subdivision (c)(8). Self-help personnel should be familiar with the court rules
and the most commonly used statutory provisions. Requests for information beyond
these commonly used statutory provisions would require legal research, which is
prohibited by subdivision (d)(8).
Subdivision (f). Because an attorney-client relationship is not formed, the in-
formation provided by a self-represented litigant is not confidential or privileged.
Subdivision (g). Because an attorney-client relationship is not formed, there is
no conflict in providing the limited services authorized under this rule to both
parties.
Id.
237 RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP
TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WrrIHOUT LAWYERS (2002). For other proposals to guide court staff in
providing information and assistance to pro se parties, see Goldschmidt et al., supra note 212,
at 41-45.
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* Due to the current shortage of adequate legal services for the
poor and the likelihood of an appreciable shortage of such ser-
vices continuing indefinitely even if the shortage is somewhat
reduced in the short term, increased efforts should be made to
more efficiently and effectively utilize available personnel who
provide legal services for the poor. This more efficient and ef-
fective utilization of personnel should include allocating a
greater proportion of available legal services personnel to
projects that could greatly increase the number of poor persons
benefited. Among such projects are preparing for and litigating
more major cases concerning the poor, providing limited (un-
bundled) legal services to many more poor persons who would
provide the remaining services pro se, and assisting many more
persons to fully and competently represent themselves pro se.
As is evident from the above coverage in Parts I to V, how the
shortage problem should best be dealt with raises many law and policy
issues, solutions which currently are, or soon will become, highly contro-
versial. Proposals that are here recommended for resolving many of
these issues are included in Parts I to V. Alternative proposals can be
made to each of the above-recommended proposals, and some of these
alternatives may have considerable merit. But each of the alternatives
with considerable merit is less desirable than the comparable recom-
mended proposal above because its prospects for adoption are less effec-
tive, or if adopted would have a less effective impact. Some of these
alternative proposals, however, merit not only support but also adoption
as a substitute for the comparable preferred recommended proposals
above if it becomes obvious that the comparable preferred proposals
above will not be adopted in the near future. An example of such an
alternative proposal is the one made above as to efforts to increase volun-
tary pro bono for the poor in each U.S. jurisdiction.238
Adoption of most any law or policy proposal requires that propo-
nents of the proposal effectively engage in one or more strategies. To
achieve adoption, the scope and intensity of proponent strategic actions
usually must be greater if the proposal is highly controversial. What
strategies may be useful, even essential, can vary with who the current or
prospective proposal proponents and opponents are, why the proposal is
or may be supported and opposed, and who the ultimate decision maker
will be. There are many different strategies that may be useful, some of
them even essential, to successfully achieving adoption of any proposal
to help resolve a law or policy issue, including the recommended propos-
als in Parts I to V above. Among such strategies are: acquiring reliable
238 See supra Part III.B.
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data on the need for the proposal and the proposal's likely favorable im-
pact if adopted; obtaining popular, trade journal, or professional journal
publicity favorable to or indicating the need for the proposal; in-person
meetings with influential prospective proponents of the proposal to ob-
tain their active support of the proposal; in-person meetings with actual
or prospective opponents of the proposal to try and persuade them not to
oppose the proposal and possibly even to support it; instituting litigation
that may result in a judicial decision that adopts or requires adoption of
the proposal; providing testimony or evidence in support of the proposal
at hearings held by decision makers on whether or not to adopt the pro-
posal; and working cooperatively with other proponents of the proposal
to develop and implement programs of action to obtain proposal adop-
tion. Useful strategies in achieving adoption of any particular proposal
may vary over time, among jurisdictions, with who the ultimate decision
maker is, and with who the actual or prospective proponents and oppo-
nents are. All of the recommended proposals in Parts I to V currently are
or may become highly controversial. To enhance adoption prospects for
any proposal, proponents should become aware of all the strategies avail-
able to them for achieving adoption and should select and sufficiently
implement those strategies available to them that are most likely to
achieve adoption of the proposal.
A strategy that usually is very essential to obtain adoption of most
every proposal to increase adequate legal services for the poor, including
most all of the above recommended proposals, is developing and sus-
taining cooperative relations with others who support the proposal. The
proposal adoption process usually is a collective endeavor. But to en-
hance the effectiveness of this endeavor as to proposals to increase ade-
quate legal services for the poor what is very much needed is a national
organization with the requisite resources, influence and commitment to
provide comprehensive leadership, support and assistance to proponents
of each proposal. Among activities that this organization should engage
in are thoroughly evaluating all proposals to increase adequate legal ser-
vices and for the poor to determine which proposals merit support and, if
so, what support and the timing of support activities; providing supple-
mental support and assistance to other organizations and individuals in
their efforts to obtain adoption of proposals meriting support; forming
coalitions of organizations and individuals who support a proposal merit-
ing support and providing coordination, guidance and supplemental sup-
port and assistance to each such coalition in its efforts to obtain adoption
of a proposal meriting support; engaging on its own in efforts to achieve
adoption of proposals that it considers merit support, efforts such as pub-
licizing the proposal and its merits in its publications, exerting political
pressure on government decision makers who will determine whether or
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not to adopt a particular proposal; and engaging in empirical research
that provides data it publicizes supportive of a particular proposal. This
national organization should be active in providing leadership, support
and assistance not only to proposals that are applicable throughout the
United States but to many of the proposals that are applicable only to a
particular state or locality. It should also be of help in determining which
proposals meriting support should receive priority over other proposals
when the proposals are competitive with one another, as is common with
many of the above proposals, particularly funding proposals. In addition,
when it would be helpful, the national organization should be capable of
developing new proposals or revising existing proposals to enhance their
prospects of adoption.
Some national organizations currently exist that to some extent, and
as to some kinds of proposals, provide needed leadership, support, and
assistance. Among these national organizations are the LSC, ABA, Na-
tional Lawyers' Guild, Federal Bar Association, American College of
Trial Lawyers, National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, National
District Attorneys Association, National Conference of Federal Trial
Judges, and Association of American Law Schools. Unfortunately, none
of these organizations fully and adequately provides the comprehensive
and integrative support that is needed and is possible. Fortunately, how-
ever, a national organization does exist with the realistic potential for
doing so. That organization is the ABA, and it is here recommended that
the ABA make and fulfill the commitment necessary to become such an
organization. It is possible that a new organization could be established
to fill the needed role but it is very unlikely that such an organization will
be established, and if established the prospects for it to fully and ade-
quately fill the need are negligible. The ABA is a far better prospect.
The ABA is a very large and influential national organization. It has a
membership of 350,000 U.S. lawyers and about 50,000 affiliate mem-
bers, 80% of whom are law students and 20% are associates-i.e., for-
eign lawyers not admitted to practice law in this country and U.S.
paralegals. It also has a large paid staff and many very active commit-
tees, sections and other subunits of members. 239 Two ABA standing
committees, the Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants and
the Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service are principally concerned
with expanding and improving legal services for the poor. Among other
ABA subunits, some of whose activities are very relevant to issues con-
cerning the provision of adequate legal services for the poor, are the
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility; Ethics,
239 For a listing of the many hundreds of ABA subunits and their officers, see ABA
LEADERSHIP DIRECTORY, 37-235, available at https://www.abanet.org/1sd/leadership/nmdirec-
tory.html (2010).
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Gideon and Professionalism Committee of the Criminal Justice Section's
Professional Development Division; Special Committee on Coalition for
Justice; Commission on Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts; Accredita-
tion Committee of the Legal Education and Admission to the Bar Sec-
tion; and Pro Bono Committees of some ABA sections. The ABA Board
of Governors and House of Delegates also often become involved in is-
sues concerning more adequate legal services for the poor. The ABA
maintains close operational relations with state and local bar associa-
tions, and with twenty-eight affiliated organizations, including the Amer-
ican Judicature Society, the Association of American Law Schools, and
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. 240 With some expan-
sion of its activities to increase adequate legal services for the poor and
considerable enhanced coordination of those activities, the ABA could
become the needed national organization and should be pressured to do
so. It could replicate for legal services for the poor the tremendous influ-
ence it has had and continues to have on professional conduct require-
ments for lawyers and judges. 24 1 There, of course, is the possibility that
on occasion, as to some issues relevant to increased adequate legal ser-
vices for the poor, opposition from some segments of its membership
would prevent the ABA from supporting or fully supporting some pro-
posals favored by most providers of legal services for the poor. But the
ABA is an unusual organization in the extent to which it has enabled
different interest groups within its membership to pursue objectives op-
posed by other interest groups within its membership. The ABA has
been moving in the direction of becoming the national organization that
will provide the needed comprehensive leadership, support and assis-
tance to proponents of proposals for increased adequate legal services for
the poor, including proposals such as those in Parts I to V above. This
movement should be accelerated and fully realized as soon as possible.
If fully realized it would greatly increase the prospects for far more poor
persons in the United States in need of legal services having their legal
needs adequately fulfilled, and thereby substantially reducing the scope
and severity of one of this nation's most serious unresolved problems.
240 For a list of the ABA's twenty-eight affiliated organizations, including each affiliated
organization's ABA House of Delegates Representative, see id. at 237-54.
241 On the history of the ABA's involvement in developing and influencing the adoption
of legal canons, codes and rules of professional conduct for lawyers, see ABA CTR. FOR
PROFL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr (1987); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARvis, THE LAW
OF LAWYERING §1.10-1.18 (3d ed. 2010).
